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INTRODUCTION
The concept of capital punishment and its origin may be difficult to 
identify; however, societies throughout time have implemented it as a form 
of punishment.2  Originally recognized as a private vengeance,3 the State, 
through its sovereign authority, accepted the power to punish those who 
1
 Luis M. Fusté is a J.D. graduate from Florida International University College of Law, May 
2006, and has worked in law enforcement for over 23 years.   
2
 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 334-35 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).   
3
 Id. at 333.  
53
98 FIU Law Review [2:97
violated its laws.4  The history of capital punishment under common law 
commenced in England as early as the Thirteenth Century.5  While early 
English law recognized eight major capital crimes,6 capital punishment’s 
reach escalated to well over 200 numbered offenses.7  Although capital pun-
ishment was less common in the colonies, American colonies codified capi-
tal offenses early in 1636 when the Massachusetts Bay Colony enumerated 
13 acts as punishable by death.8
In America, opposition to the death penalty came early in its brief 
capital punishment jurisprudence.9  In 1794, Pennsylvania abolished capital 
punishment for all crimes except murder in the first degree, which was held 
to encompass all willful, deliberate and premeditated killings.10  This 
change prescribed mandatory death penalty for all those convicted of mur-
der.11  Following Pennsylvania’s reform, Virginia and several other states 
enacted similar statutes.12  This anti-capital punishment movement traveled 
across the country, yet it lost its momentum with the commencement of the 
Civil War.13  Movements aimed at ending or reforming the use of the death 
penalty have accompanied capital punishment since it was imported from 
Europe.14
To this day, the United States continues to struggle, not only with the 
imposition of the death penalty, but with the method of execution.15  Ac-
cording to a Gallup Poll survey, two in three Americans say they are in fa-
vor of the death penalty for convicted murderers;16 however, when asked to 
4
 Id. n.41 (noting that the Code of Hammurabi is one of the first known laws to recognize death 
as a form of punishment for homicide). 
5
 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197 (1971). 
6
 Furman, 408 U.S at 334 (recognizing treason, petty treason (killing of husband by his wife), 
murder, larceny, robbery, burglary, rape, and arson as capital crimes). 
7
 Id.
8
 Id. at 335 (using the Old Testament as the source, the crimes punishable by death were: idola-
try, witchcraft, blasphemy, murder, assault in sudden anger, sodomy, buggery, adultery, statutory rape, 
rape, manstealing, perjury in a capital trial, and rebellion).  
9
 McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198; see also Jill M. Cochran, Note, Courting Death: 30 Years Since 
Furman, is the Death Penalty Any Less Discriminatory? Looking at the Problem of Jury Discretion in 
Capital Sentencing, 38 VAL. U. L. REV 1399, 1405 n.34 (2004) (noting that the Colonists were less eager 
to apply the death penalty when compared to the British).  
10
 Furman, 408 U.S. at 336; McGaurtha, 402 U.S. at 198. 
11
 Furman, 408 U.S. at 336. 
12
 McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198. 
13
 Cochran, supra note 7, at 36 (noting that as a capital abolishment movement was sweeping the 
country, Maine enacted a statute that stayed all executions for one year after convictions.  This move-
ment ended when the Civil War caused a shift to the nation’s focus.  The movement emerged once again 
after the war; however, penal reform, the Great Depression as well as World War I and II placed a per-
manent halt in the efforts to abolish the death penalty). 
14
 Furman, 408 U.S at 342. 
15
 Id.
16
 Lydia Saad, Support for Death Penalty Steady at 64%, Slightly Lower than in Recent Past, THE
GALLUP ORGANIZATION, December 8, 2005, http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=20350&pg 
=1 (last visited May 9, 2006). 
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choose between life imprisonment and death, the numbers are quite lower.17
Currently, 38 states still have death penalty statutes.18 Internationally, how-
ever, there are more nations that have abolished capital punishment than 
those who continue to impose it.19
While a general opposition to the death penalty continues in this coun-
try,20 today the greater concern turns on who is to determine whether a per-
son is sentenced to death: the judge or the jury?21  Modern capital punish-
ment jurisprudence starts with the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. 
Georgia.22  The impact Furman had on this nation’s utilization of capital 
punishment can only be rivaled by a string of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions which, when examined collectively, reveal a new turning point in the 
Court’s evolving capital punishment jurisprudence.23
Through an analysis of various decisions, this Comment will trace the 
United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the issue of capital pun-
ishment and how these decisions have varied in light of the challenges as-
serted by those seeking relief.  Additionally, by examining these cases with 
a focus on Florida’s capital punishment jurisprudence, this Comment will 
illustrate how the development of capital punishment jurisprudence and 
Sixth Amendment protection by the courts has rendered Florida’s current 
17
 Id.
18 Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, http://web.amnesty.org 
/pages/deathpenalty-facts-eng (last visited August 24, 2006). 
19 Id. (88 countries have abolished Capital Punishment while 69 continue to exercise death pen-
alty statutes.  In the U.S. 60 prisoners were executed in 2005, bringing the year-end total to 1004 exe-
cuted since the use of the death penalty was resumed in 1977.  As of January 1, 2006, over 3,400 prison-
ers are under a sentence of death.  The death penalty is also provided under U.S. federal military and 
civilian law).  
20
 See Bruce Fein, Death Penalty Usurpations, WASH. TIMES, Feb.10, 2004, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20040209-090307-1481r.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).  
The following are several of the organizations who oppose the death penalty and were consulted during 
Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W. 3d 397 (Miss 2003), whereby the Missouri Supreme Court held that execut-
ing individuals under 18 years of age at the time of their capital crimes was prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment: American Psychiatric Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psy-
chiatry, American Friends Service Committee, Mormons for Equality and Social Justice, The Rabbinical 
Assembly and the United States Catholic Conference.  
21
 Benjamin F. Diamond, The Sixth Amendment: Where Did the Jury Go? Florida’s Flawed Sen-
tencing in Death Penalty Cases, 55 FLA. L. REV. 905, 906 (2003) (this comment complements Dia-
mond’s article by adding the more recent United States Supreme Court decisions which reveal the 
Court’s undertaking in expanding Sixth Amendment protection). 
22
 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 at 291, (holding that the death penalty as applied by the states 
was arbitrary and capricious; states must adopt statutes that provide “guided discretion”). 
23
 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002) (holding that an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment reliant on the finding of a fact, 
that fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 
(2004) (defining statutory maximum as “the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis 
of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”). 
54
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death penalty statute unconstitutional. The sequence of cases will reveal 
that whereas Florida’s capital punishment sentencing scheme did at one 
time conform to the Supreme Court’s mandate under Furman, today it is 
unconstitutional. 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PRE-FURMAN
Since the Furman decision appears to be the point of demarcation on 
the new era of change with respect to application of the death penalty, a 
brief look at capital punishment jurisprudence that preceded Furman is ap-
propriate.  Merely six months prior to the decision in Furman, the Supreme 
Court ruled McGautha v. California.24  In McGautha, the Court determined 
that statutes that permitted a jury to impose the death penalty without gov-
erning standards—thereby entrusting the imposition of a death penalty to 
the jury’s absolute discretion—did not infringe upon a defendant’s constitu-
tional rights.25  Because the petitioners were from different states, the Su-
preme Court dealt with statutes from both California and Ohio.26
Dennis Councle McGautha, a co-defendant to a robbery-homicide was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death under California law.27  Pre-
scribed by California statute, punishment for a capital felony was deter-
mined in a separate proceeding following the trial on the issue of guilt.28
James Edward Crampton was sentenced to death under an Ohio statute after 
being convicted of murdering his wife.29  The applicable Ohio death penalty 
statute at the time provided that the jury alone would determine guilt and 
punishment after a single trial and in a single verdict.  Furthermore, the trial 
or the appellate court could not modify the jury’s death verdict.30
Although the Court was dealing with the statutes of two states, it rec-
ognized that the decision would be based on whether the Federal Constitu-
tion prohibited the procedures used by each of the states to sentence the 
24 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
25
 Id. at 183-85. 
26
 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.05 (1954).    
27
 Id. at 185; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (“The guilt or innocence of every person charged 
with an offense for which the penalty is in the alternative death or imprisonment for life shall first be 
determined, without a finding as to penalty.  If such person has been found guilty of an offense punish-
able by life imprisonment or death, and has been found sane on any plea of not guilty by reason of 
insanity, there shall thereupon be further proceedings on the issue of penalty, and the trier of fact shall 
fix the penalty.”). 
28
 McGautha, 402 U.S. at 185. 
29
 Id. at 187.    
30
 Id. at 182-95. (the jury was instructed as follows: “If you find the defendant guilty of murder in 
the first degree, the punishment is death, unless you recommend mercy, in which event the punishment 
is imprisonment in the penitentiary during life”)  Id. at 194.  Four hours later, the jury returned a verdict 
of guilty, with no recommendation for mercy.  Id. at 182.  See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.05.  
(the statute permits the verdict to stand unless there is prejudicial error vitiating the conviction or insuf-
ficient evidence to convict penalty). 
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defendants to death.31  Both defendants had a common claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process: “[T]hat the absence of 
standards to guide the jury's discretion on the punishment issue is constitu-
tionally intolerable.”32  The Court conducted an exhaustive inquiry into the 
history tracing capital punishment back to colonial times and through the 
modern era.33  It recognized that academic and professional sources have 
recommended that jury sentencing discretion should be guided by standards 
of some sort,34 that several states had enacted new criminal codes adopting 
features of the Model Penal Code, and that others had adapted laws with 
respect to murder and the death penalty in other ways.35  However, none of 
the states had adopted statutory criteria for imposition of the death penalty.36
In evaluating the States’ practices using federal constitutional stan-
dards, the Court rejected the due process argument.37  The Court reasoned 
that sole discretion of the jury to determine life or death in capital cases is 
not offensive to the Constitution and that an established set of standards to 
guide the jury would be impossible.  They noted that, “[t]o identify before 
the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators 
which call for the death penalty and to express these characteristics in lan-
guage which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing author-
ity appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability.”38  Further-
more, the Court reasoned that although “a link between contemporary 
community values and the penal system” must be present in sentencing 
matters, juries are guided by their “innate capacity” and thus better suited to 
comprehend the values of the community than those which may be devel-
oped by legislature.39
The Court placed a great deal of faith on jurors and their moral obliga-
tion as guidance.  However, it recognized that there may be superior means 
of rendering a fair decision.40  The dissent as expressed by Justice Brennan 
31
 McGautha, 402 U.S at 196. 
32
 Id.
33
 Id. at197-203. 
34
 Id. at 202 (noting that the American Law Institute had made such a recommendation in 1959 
and that as recent as 1970, the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws published a 
Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code which called for mandatory procedural provisions for 
capital sentencing that a jury was required to consider before rendering its decision).  
35
 Id.
36
 Id.
37 Id. at 203. 
38
 Id. at 204; see also Steven Semeraro, Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 39 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 79, 102-04 (2002) (noting that the Court’s decision was not based on analysis or democratic theory, 
it relied on jurors’ sense of responsibility for their task, since jurors faced with rendering such an tre-
mendous decision will act with appropriate moral seriousness and moral rationality).  
39
 McGautha, 402 U.S at 204.   
40
 Id. at 221 (acknowledging that while the Federal Constitution required solely that trials be 
fairly conducted and that guaranteed rights of defendants be thoroughly respected, the American Law 
Institute and the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws had concluded that bifur-
55
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called for the reversal of both death penalties and the imposition of a set of 
guidelines to aid the decision maker in rendering judgment.41
FLORIDA’S PRE-FURMAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SENTENCING SCHEME
The governing capital punishment statute in Florida during the pre-
Furman era was similar to that of the Ohio statute previously discussed.42
Under Florida law at that time, if an individual was found guilty of an of-
fense punishable by death, the jury’s verdict imposed the penalty of death 
unless a recommendation of mercy was made by a majority vote.43  The 
sentence of death in a capital case was therefore mandatory with excep-
tions.44  In deciding whether to impose a life or death sentence, the sentenc-
ing body in Florida was left with no specific standards which it could draw 
from to guide its decision-making process.45  In Florida, the jury had broad 
parameters in what it could consider when deciding whether the death pen-
alty or life imprisonment was the appropriate sentence.46  Furthermore, un-
der the then-existing statute, when the right to a jury trial was waived, or 
when the defendant pled guilty or nolo contendre, the judge sitting alone 
made the determination whether to impose the sentence of death or life im-
prisonment after it found the defendant guilty of a capital offense.47
The jury’s unfettered discretion in determining whether to impose the 
death penalty or life imprisonment were challenged under various theo-
ries.48  One such case was Thomas v. Culver, wherein a black male con-
victed of raping a white female was sentenced to death under Florida’s capi-
tal punishment statute of the time.49  The defendant argued that Florida’s 
statute gave the jury “uncontrolled and unfettered power to impose the 
cated trials and standards for jury sentencing discretion were superior means of dealing with capital 
cases).    
41
 Id. at 250, 252 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the statutes before the Court as “stark 
legislative abdication” since there wasn’t “the slightest attempt to bring the power of reason to bear on 
the considerations relevant to capital sentencing.” Supervision of this jury process insures consistency in 
decisions and in its absence “it can amount to nothing more than government by whim, and a govern-
ment by whim is the very antithesis of due process.”)  Id.     
42
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.05 (death penalty was imposed absent a recommendation for 
mercy by jury).   
43
 FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1971) (stating in pertinent part: “A defendant found guilty by a jury of 
an offense punishable by death shall be sentenced to death unless the verdict includes a recommendation 
to mercy by a majority of the jury.  When the verdict includes a recommendation to mercy by a majority 
of the jury, the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment”); see also King v. Moore, 831 
So. 2d. 143, 150 (Fla. 2002).        
44
 Hargave v. Florida, 366 So. 2d. 1, 7 (Fla. 1979).    
45
 King, 831 So. 2d at 150. 
46
 See State of Florida ex rel. Thomas v. Culver, 253 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1958)  
47
 Id.
48
 Id. (noting that defendant Jimmie Lee Thomas challenged the jury’s lack of guidance under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).  
49
 Id.
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death sentence on some and not to impose it on others found guilty of the 
same crime,” and thus was contradictory to the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.50
The Court of Appeals rejected his argument and reaffirmed the capital 
sentencing jurisprudence of that time by asserting that due to the “uncon-
trolled character of the determinations that are confided to the jury” and the 
“inviolability” associated with the jury room, the statute, which allows the 
jury to render all determinations, was not unconstitutional in its applica-
tion.51  The Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Andres v. United States, where it held that where a statute which provided 
for a jury to decide whether the accused should or should not be capitally 
punished, the lower court “sufficiently explained the scope of the jury’s 
discretion in granting mercy” by stating that the discretion was entirely 
within the discretion of the jury.52
These cases illustrate that when determining whether a defendant who 
had been found guilty of a capital offense was to be sentenced to life in 
prison or to death, the Constitution did not mandate standards to guide the 
jury in its determination.  Even when issues of disparate treatment, unfair 
application of death penalty statutes, and due process concerns were raised 
before the courts, capital punishment jurisprudence preferred “to leave to 
juries finding defendants guilty of a crime the power to fix punishment 
within legally prescribed limits.”53  Despite alternative sentencing schemes 
which would appear to ensure some level of equality,54 the courts continued 
to assert that “[t]wo-part jury trials . . . have never been compelled . . . as a 
matter of constitutional law, or even as a matter of federal procedure.”55
Yet, the argument that unregulated jury discretion may be problematic 
was not foreign to the Supreme Court.56  In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, the 
Supreme Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute that empowered juries, 
without definite standards to govern their discretion or determination, in 
assessing costs against acquitted defendants with a threat of imprisonment 
until the costs were paid.57  The Court held that due to the statute’s lack of 
50
 Id. at 508 (arguing that based on statistics over a period of 20 years, “Negroes convicted of rape 
as a class and because of their race, were sentenced to death more often than white persons convicted of 
the same crime.”).   
51
 Id.
52
 Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 744 n.4 (1948).  
53
 Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 151 (8th Cir. 1968) (citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 
399, 405 (1969)). 
54
 See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 202-03 (discussing sentencing schemes that, while not constitution-
ally mandated, could be adopted by the states); see also id. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (indicating 
that the Due Process Clause authorized the Court to ensure that “no State takes one man's life for rea-
sons that it would not apply to another.”).  
55
 Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 151 (citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1969)).   
56
 Giaccio, 382 U.S. 399.    
57
 Id. at 401.  
56
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standards, a defendant was unable to protect herself from “arbitrarily and 
discriminatory imposition[s] . . . .” Therefore, it was held that the statute 
failed to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause.58 In what would 
later become the general principle of modern-capital punishment jurispru-
dence, the Court in Giaccio established that a statute that “[is] so vague and 
standardless . . . and leaves . . . jurors free to decide, without any legally 
fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not [violated the] premise 
that the law must be one that carries an understandable meaning with legal 
standards that courts must enforce.”59
THE END OF ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS SENTENCING IN DEATH PENALTY 
CASES
On June 29, 1972, by a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court found that the 
death penalty, as applied by the statutes under review, was cruel and un-
usual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.60
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall concluded that capital punishment per 
se was unconstitutional, and an insult to human dignity.61  Yet Brennan’s 
concurring opinion provides an insight to the Court’s evolving standards of 
capital punishment jurisprudence at that time:  
Death is truly an awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a 
human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the 
executed person's humanity.  The contrast with the plight of a person 
punished by imprisonment is evident.  An individual in prison does 
not lose the right to have rights.  A prisoner retains, for example, the 
constitutional rights to the free exercise of religion, to be free of cruel 
and unusual punishments, and to treatment as a “person” for purposes 
of due process of law and the equal protection of the laws.  A prisoner 
remains a member of the human family. Moreover, he retains the right 
of access to the courts.  His punishment is not irrevocable.  An exe-
cuted person has indeed “lost the right to have rights . . .. ‘His execu-
58
 Id. at 401-02. 
59
 Id. at 403 (while holding that the lack of standards was violative of the Due Process Clause in 
this particular instance, the Court was quick to point out two factors: first, the Court reached this deci-
sion because the issue did not involve a penal statute and second, this decision should cast no doubt on 
the constitutionality to leave to juries’ findings the power to fix punishments).        
60
 Furman, 408 U.S. 238.    
61
 Id. at 297-99 (Brennan, J. concurring) (arguing that the imposition of the death penalty was per 
se unconstitutional, and distinguishing the death penalty from all other forms of punishment imposed by 
the states, “[d]eath is today an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its 
enormity); see also id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J. concurring) (arguing that the death penalty was excessive 
and unnecessary and violated the Eighth Amendment).     
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tion is a way of saying, you are not fit for this world, take your chance 
elsewhere.’”62
The Court in Furman established that the imposition of the death pen-
alty in Georgia and Texas was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the imposition of the death 
penalty was administered in an “unlimited and unguided manner.”63  The 
Court, in recognizing that death was a different kind of punishment from 
any other which may be imposed by the states, and that the states were ap-
plying this punishment without guidance, struck down all state capital pun-
ishment statutes on the ground that they violated the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.64  While the Court declined to find 
capital punishment itself unconstitutional,65 it did rule that the application of 
capital punishment governed by statutes that afforded a sentencing body 
discretion as to whether a human life should be taken or spared, “must be 
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary 
and capricious” application.66  The five Justices that made up the majority 
had their own rationale as to why the statues under review were unconstitu-
tional.67  Conversely, Justices Marshall and Brennan argued that the death 
penalty was per se unconstitutional.68  Justice Douglas was concerned that 
death penalty statutes that lacked standards by which to guide the jury 
would result in race and class bias.69  Justice Stewart, who was not con-
vinced that racial discrimination had been proven, nevertheless concluded 
that the legal system which imposes a sentence of death “so wantonly and 
so freakishly” could not be tolerated under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.70  Justice White also reasoned similarly to Justice Stewart in 
that “the [death] penalty [is] . . . so infrequently imposed that the threat of 
execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice.”71                       
Despite the diverse approaches by the Court in reaching its decision, 
the result in Furman was a categorical attack on all capital punishment stat-
utes that permitted broad, unguided discretion, and ultimately resulted in an 
62
 Id. at 290 (Brennan, J. concurring) (citing Stephen, “Capital Punishments,” 69 FRASER'S
MAGAZINE 753, 763 (1864)). 
63
 Id. at 239-40.   
64
 Cochran, supra note 54, at 1412 (discussing that the Court’s 5-4 decision seemed to signal the 
demise of the death penalty).   
65
 Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (Marshall, J. and Brennan, J., concurring).   
66
 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).    
67
 See supra notes 65-66 (discussing how each justice held the death penalty, as applied by the 
states, to be unconstitutional).  
68
 Furman, 408 U.S. 238. 
69
 Id. at 250 (Douglas, J. concurring) (“[t]he death sentence is disproportionately imposed and 
carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular groups”).   
70
 Id. at 238 (Stewart, J. concurring). 
71
 Id. at 313 (White, J. concurring). 
57
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end to the imposition of death in an arbitrary and capricious manner.72  In 
light of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,73
all capital sentencing statutes had to provide procedural safeguards that 
guide and restrain the discretion of the sentencing authorities when deter-
mining between the death penalty and life imprisonment.74  In the years 
following Furman, thirty-five states rushed to enact new capital sentencing 
statutes.75
CAPITAL SENTENCING POST-FURMAN: THE ROAD TO RECOVERY 
It was not long before newly-amended statutes were challenged before 
the United States Supreme Court.  In 1976, the Supreme Court handed 
down five decisions regarding capital punishment and the application of 
newly-enacted death penalty statutes.76  Louisiana and North Carolina’s 
statutes were held to be unconstitutional because that they employed man-
datory sentencing.77  The other three states received the Court’s approval.78
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court took note that Georgia had taken steps to 
cure the infirmities associated with the Furman decision by providing pro-
cedural safeguards when seeking the death penalty.79  To avoid the applica-
tion of the death penalty in an arbitrary manner, Georgia’s sentencing 
scheme provided guided discretion and allowed a jury to make the determi-
nation as to the presence of aggravating factors.80  The jury’s findings of 
72
 Frank Leonard Madia, Death Penalty Jurisprudence: The Difference Between Life and Death,
14 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 73, 82 (2000). 
73
 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).   
74
 Id. at 81-84. 
 75 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80 (“The most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the 
death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman.  The legislatures of at least 35 States 
have enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty for at least some crimes that result in the 
death of another person.  And the Congress of the United States, in 1974, enacted a statute providing the 
death penalty for aircraft piracy that results in death.”).  
76
 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).       
77
 Roberts, 428 U.S. 325; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (“A . . . constitutional shortcoming of the 
North Carolina statute is its failure to allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the 
character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of 
death.”).       
78
 Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Jurek, 428 U.S. 262.         
79
 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162 (“The Georgia statute, as amended after our decision in Furman . . . 
retains the death penalty for six categories of crime: murder, kidnapping for ransom or where the victim 
is harmed, armed robbery rape, treason, and aircraft hijacking. . . . The capital defendant’s guilt or inno-
cence is determined . . . by a trial judge or a jury, in the first stage of a bifurcated trial.”).  
80
 Id. at 164-65 (“[T]he judge is also required to consider or to include in his instructions to the 
jury any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of 
(10) statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence . . . .  Before a con-
victed defendant may be sentenced to death . . . the jury, or the trial judge in cases tried without a jury, 
must find beyond a reasonable doubt one of the 10 aggravating circumstances specified in the statute.”).  
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aggravating and mitigating factors were to be taken into consideration be-
fore sentencing a person to death.81
The Court continued to evolve its application of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendment when challenges to the constitutionality of various 
states’ death penalty statutes were brought before it.82  As the post-Furman
era continued, the Court struck down some of the very statutes that it had 
previously held to be valid.83  Previously held to be constitutional,84 Geor-
gia’s death penalty statute, which required the existence of “aggravating 
circumstances” before imposing a death penalty, was subsequently struck 
down for vagueness.85
FLORIDA’S POST-FURMAN DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING SCHEME
As a result of Furman, Florida had the nation’s first “post-Furman”
death penalty statute.86  Although different than what the Supreme Court 
reviewed under Georgia’s sentencing scheme in Gregg,87 the Court upheld 
Florida’s hybrid system in Proffitt v. Florida where a judge and not a jury 
determined the sentence.88  While all procedural designs adopted by the 
states to impose the death penalty must comport to the Furman mandate, 
only three states utilize a “hybrid” system: Florida,89 Alabama,90 and Dela-
ware.
91
81
 GA. CODE  § 17-10-31.1.    
82
 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Gregg, 428 
U.S. at 173 (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).    
83
 Penry, 492 U.S. at 320.  Although in Jurek v. Texas the Court held the Texas statute constitu-
tional.  This was due to the fact that it permitted the sentencer to consider relevant mitigating evidence 
in imposing a sentence.  Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271-72.  In Penry, the Court found that its application was 
not in accordance with the Eight and Fourteenth Amendment.  Penry, at 302.  The defendant argued that 
“the jury was unable to fully consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence.”  Id. at 303.  “The 
Texas death penalty statute was applied in an unconstitutional manner by precluding the jury from 
acting upon the particular mitigating evidence he introduced.”  Id. at 320.      
84
 Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.   
85
 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 426, 428. (“[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment, it has a 
constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capri-
cious infliction of the death penalty . . . [I]t must channel the sentencer’s discretion by “clear and objec-
tive standards” that provide “specific and detailed guidance,” and that “make rationally reviewable the 
process for imposing a sentence of death.” . . .  [A] death penalty “system could have standards so vague 
that they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the result that a 
pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur.”).   
86
 Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of the Mess: Steps Toward Addressing and Avoiding Inordinate 
Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 18 (1998). 
87
 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (noting that Georgia’s new sentencing scheme required that a jury 
make specific findings of facts as to the presence of  aggravating and or mitigating circumstances before 
the imposition of death).
88
 Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242-48 (“The basic difference between the Florida system and the Georgia 
system is that in Florida the trial judge determines the sentence rather than the jury; the Florida proce-
dures for imposition of the death penalty satisfy the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman”).  
89
 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2002). 
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Under current Florida law, when a jury finds a defendant guilty of a 
capital felony, the defendant can be sentenced to death or life imprisonment 
without parole.92  However, to determine whether a sentence of death or life 
imprisonment will be imposed, the statute directs the court to follow the 
procedures set forth in Section 921.141(1) of the Florida Statutes.93  During 
this second procedure, the trial judge, along with a jury (preferably the 
same jury that rendered the guilty verdict) conducts a separate proceeding 
on the issues of penalty.94  The “guided discretion” provided by the statute 
allows the sentencer to consider specified enumerated aggravating and 
mitigating factors when deciding between death and a prison sentence.95
90
 ALA CODE § 13A-5-46(a) (1994). 
91
 DEL. CODE ANN. TI. 11, § 4209(d) (1995). 
92
 See FLA. STAT. ANN § 775.082 (West 2004). Penalties:  
(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the pro-
ceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in § 921.141 results in 
findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall 
be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole. 
93
 Id.
94
 This sentencing phase is mandatory to all death penalty cases since the Court’s decision on 
Furman; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1) (West 2002) (“If the trial jury is unable to reconvene for a 
hearing on the issue of penalty, having determined the guilt of the accused, the trail judge may summon 
a special juror or jurors.”).      
95
 See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (5)(6) (West 2002).  Aggravating circumstances: 
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under sen-
tence of imprisonment or placed on community control or on felony probation. 
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the 
use or threat of violence to the person. 
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. 
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in 
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, 
any: robbery; sexual battery; aggravated child abuse; abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult 
resulting in great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; arson; burglary; 
kidnapping; aircraft piracy; or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device 
or bomb. 
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or 
effecting an escape from custody. 
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. 
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental 
function or the enforcement of laws. 
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated 
manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. 
(j) The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of 
his or her official duties. 
(k) The victim of the capital felony was an elected or appointed public official engaged in the per-
formance of his or her official duties if the motive for the capital felony was related, in whole or in 
part, to the victim's official capacity. 
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Regardless of general admissibility rules under the rules of evidence, 
the court may allow any evidence as to any matter it deems relevant to the 
nature of the crime and character of the defendant during this second pro-
ceeding.96  The state and the defendant may present arguments for or against 
the sentence of death.97  After hearing all of the evidence with regards to 
aggravating or mitigating factors, the jury renders an advisory sentence.98
The jury’s advisory sentence, which determines whether the mitigating cir-
cumstances are present to offset the aggravating circumstances, is reached 
by majority decision rather than unanimous vote.99
(l) The victim of the capital felony was a person less than 12 years of age. 
(m) The victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability, 
or because the defendant stood in a position of familial or custodial authority over the victim. 
(n) The capital felony was committed by a criminal street gang member, as defined in s. 874.03. 
(6) Mitigating circumstances.--Mitigating circumstances shall be the following: 
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance. 
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act. 
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his or 
her participation was relatively minor. 
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another per-
son. 
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform 
his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. 
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
(h) The existence of any other factors in the defendant's background that would mitigate against 
imposition of the death penalty.  
   See also Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242 (“Florida trial judges are given specific and detailed guidance to 
assist them in deciding whether to impose a death penalty or imprisonment for life, and their decisions 
are reviewed to ensure that they comport with other sentences imposed under similar circumstances”).      
96
 See generally Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242.  (The court permits all evidence it deems to have probative 
value. This over inclusive approach does not permit any evidence secured in violation of the Constitu-
tion of the United States or Florida.). 
97
 Id.
98
 FLA.STAT.  § 921.141 (2) (West 2002).  Advisory Sentence By The Jury - After hearing all of 
the relevant evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court, based on the 
following matters:  
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5); 
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances found to exist; and 
(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprison-
ment or death. 
99
 Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 710 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, C.J., concurring) ( “[I]n Florida, 
the jury's advisory recommendation in a capital case is not statutorily required to be by unanimous vote[, 
t]he jury's advisory recommendation may be by mere majority vote.”).  
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Yet, this advisory sentence is not binding on the trial court’s deci-
sion.100  The final determination as to whether the defendant is sentenced to 
death rests exclusively with the judge.101  However, while the jury’s sen-
tence is only advisory in character, the court must give deference to the 
jury’s sentence when it weighs all of the possible factors and renders its 
own decision.102  Anytime the court imposes the death penalty, the court 
must support its verdict by specific findings of fact.103  Even though the 
jury’s recommendation is not binding on the court as a matter of law,104 the 
Florida Supreme Court has recognized the important role the jury plays in 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme and has at times referred to the jury as 
the “cosentencer.”105  Nevertheless, in the final analysis, it is the court and 
not the jury who determines the proper sentence to be administered.106  The 
court’s power to determine the sentence remains intact even when it goes 
against the jury’s recommendation.107  Hence, despite a majority vote by the 
jury recommending a life sentence, the court may impose a sentence of 
death.108
On the other hand, this power to override is not absolute. Florida Su-
preme Court case law has limited a court’s statutory authority to override a 
jury’s advisory sentence to situations “in which the facts suggesting a sen-
tence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable per-
son could differ.”109  In Spaziano, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the application of the Florida standards allowing a trial court to override a 
100
 FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (West 2002). 
101
 FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (3) (findings In Support of Sentence of Death-“Notwithstanding the 
recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court . . . shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or 
death . . . .”).  
102 Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 518 (1997) (noting that “sentencing judge in a “weighing” 
State (i.e., a state such as Florida that requires specified aggravating circumstances to be weighed 
against any mitigating circumstances at a capital trial’s sentencing phase) is required to give deference 
to a jury’s advisory sentencing recommendation.”).  
103
 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(a)(b) (West 2004).  
104
 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (holding that under Florida’s sentencing scheme the 
jury’s recommendation is not binding of the court).   
105
 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 702; see also Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1992) (Finding 
that Florida had essentially split the weighing process in two. The jury would weigh the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, and the result of that is then in turn weighed by the court's process of weigh-
ing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.).  
106
 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3). 
107
 Id.
108
 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(a)(b).  See also Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 463 (“[The] death penalty is not 
frustrated by, or inconsistent with, a scheme in which the imposition of the penalty in individual cases is 
determined by a judge . . .  We see nothing that suggests that the application of the jury-override proce-
dure has resulted in arbitrary or discriminatory application of the death penalty . . . [r]egardless of the 
jury’s recommendation, the trial judge is required to conduct an independent review of the evidence and 
to make his own findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”). 
109
 Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role of 
the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA L. REV. 1091, 1096 (2003). 
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jury’s recommendation of a life sentence by a majority vote did not violate 
the United States Constitution and had not resulted in arbitrary or discrimi-
natory application of the death penalty.110
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has held that it is not 
constitutionally necessary for a jury to decide the appropriate sentence to be 
imposed.111  Another safeguard found within the statute is that all sentences 
of death are automatically subject to review by the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida within two years.112  These standards provided by the legislature, which 
regulate the sentencing proceedings, assure that the death penalty will not 
be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner.113
The Supreme Court of Florida continues to assert that defendants are 
adequately protected by way of the statute through its procedural safeguards 
and post conviction reviews.114  The United States Supreme Court, which 
has analyzed the Florida statute’s operation in detail several times, contin-
ues to uphold Florida’s capital sentencing scheme as constitutional.115
With the appearance of “post-Furman” capital punishment statutes 
comparable to Florida,116 and with the Court’s refusal to find these unconsti-
110 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 448 (1984); See also Thomas v. State, 456 So. 2d 454, 459 
(Fla. 1984) (holding that if the facts supporting the sentence of death are clear and convincing, “the 
ultimate decision as to whether the death penalty should be imposed rests with the trial judge despite a 
jury’s recommendation of life.” (citing Hoy v. State, 353 So.2d 826, 832 (Fla. 1977))).  
111
 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251. (“On their face these procedures, like those used in Georgia, appear to 
meet the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman. The sentencing authority in Florida, the trial 
judge, is directed to weigh eight aggravating factors against seven mitigating factors to determine 
whether the death penalty shall be imposed. This determination requires the trial judge to focus on the 
circumstances of the crime and the character of the individual defendant.”).  
112 See FLA. CONST. art. V, Sec 3(b)(1) (stating in pertinent part “the Supreme Court . . . Shall hear 
appeals from final judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty.”); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (4) 
(West 2002).  
113
 Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242. 
114
 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 698. (Wells, J., concurring) (noting that in spite of shifting constitu-
tional analysis over the years, Florida’s statute provides “effective post-conviction review of the reliabil-
ity of a defendant’s trial and sentencing proceedings”); Id. at 720 (Pariente, J. concurring in result only) 
(“Florida’s . . . capital sentencing scheme . . . [provides] a defendant convicted of first-degree murder 
“with five steps between conviction and imposition of the death penalty” . . . The five steps . . . are (1) a 
post-conviction hearing before a jury, (2) a jury recommendation, (3) determination of the sentence by 
the judge, (4) written findings in support of a death sentence, and (5) review by this Court.”)(internal 
citations omitted).  
115
 See Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 526 (1997) (noting that “Flor-
ida employs a three-stage sentencing procedure. First, the jury weighs statutorily specified aggravating 
circumstances against any mitigating circumstances, and renders an “advisory sentence” of either life 
imprisonment or death . . . .  Second, the trial court weighs the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, and enters a sentence of life imprisonment or death; if the latter, its findings must be set forth in 
writing.  The jury's advisory sentence is entitled to “great weight” in the trial court’s determination . . . , 
but the court has an independent obligation to determine the appropriate punishment. . . .  Third, the 
Florida Supreme Court automatically reviews all cases in which the defendant is sentenced to death.”).    
116 E.g. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(8) (1988); see also Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 
303 (1990) (upholding the Pennsylvania statute in holding that the statute had, “cured the constitutional 
defect identified in Furman.”). 
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tutional, it appeared as though the states had taken the Court’s direction in 
Furman when drafting capital sentencing schemes that comported with the 
Eighth Amendment.117  State legislatures have continued to draft statutes 
that comply with the directive provided by the United States Supreme 
Court’s holding in Furman,118 and for the past 28 years, the United States 
Supreme Court has held Florida’s structured “hybrid” sentencing system 
constitutional and in compliance with Furman.119  While Florida’s sentenc-
ing statute has enjoyed the Court’s stamp of approval under various chal-
lenges, recent Florida Supreme Court decisions indicate the statute’s capital 
sentencing procedure may very well be unconstitutional.120
CHALLENGES TO FLORIDA’S CAPITAL SENTENCING SCHEME 
The United States did not execute anyone for four years following the 
Furman decision.121 The decision in that case caused thirty-five states to 
enact new statutes that would limit the sentencer’s discrimination and arbi-
trariness when deciding to impose a sentence of death.122  Four years after 
Furman, Florida’s newly drafted statute was challenged in Proffitt.123
In Proffitt, the petitioner stood trial and was found guilty of first-
degree murder.124  During Florida’s newly created separate sentencing hear-
ing, the jury returned an advisory verdict recommending the sentence of 
death.125  Based on the jury’s recommendation and the court’s own findings, 
the petitioner was so sentenced.126  The petitioner argued that the imposition 
of the death penalty under any circumstances was cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.127
At the time Proffitt came before the Court, the central concerns as to 
the death penalty’s constitutionality were those issues addressed in 
117
 Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 
(1976).   
118
 408 U.S. at 313 (“A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a “meaningful basis for 
distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”).  
119
 See Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977); Spaziano, 468 U.S. 447; 
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam); Lambrix, 520 U.S. 518.  
120 King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (2002); Bottoson, 833 So. 2d 693, 724 (Lewis, J., concurring in 
result only). 
121
 Cochran, supra note 9, at 1416.  
122
 Id. at 1417; see also supra note 72.  
123
 Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242.  
124
 Id. at 246. 
125
 Id.
126
 Id. at 247 (The court’s findings supporting the sentence were as follows: as to aggravating 
circumstances (1) the murder was premeditated and occurred in the course of a felony (burglary); (2) the 
petitioner has the propensity to commit murder; (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and 
cruel; and (4) the petitioner knowingly, through his intentional act, created a great risk of serious bodily 
harm and death to many persons; no mitigating statutory mitigating circumstances existed).  
127
 Id.
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Furman.128  As long as a state’s sentencing scheme “assure[d] consistency, 
fairness, and prevented the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death 
penalty,” the state’s newly drafted statute would prevail.129  The Court held 
that the death penalty was properly imposed because under Florida’s sen-
tencing scheme, the trial judge was required to focus on the circumstances 
of that particular crime and the character of the individual defendant 
through the statute’s mandatory aggravating and mitigating factors.130
The central meaning of the Court’s decision was not whether a judge 
or jury should determine the sentence given, but rather that the Constitution 
only requires that the sentencing body be provided with a procedure which 
furnishes guidance in determining the imposition of death.131  By assessing 
early post-Furman decisions under the Eighth Amendment, the key to suc-
cess for a capital sentencing statute was whether the death penalty was im-
posed in a capricious and arbitrary manner and thus would be tantamount to 
cruel and unusual punishment.132
One year after Proffitt, the Supreme Court had a second opportunity to 
review and analyze Florida’s capital sentencing statute.133  The petitioner in 
Dobbert argued that the Ex Posto Facto Clause prohibited the application of 
the new statute, which changed the function of judge and jury in the imposi-
tion of death sentences because the crime had predated the statute, and at 
the time he acted there was no valid death penalty statute in effect in Flor-
ida.134  After the petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder, the 
jury’s advisory recommendation was a sentence of life imprisonment.135
Notwithstanding the jury’s recommendation, the judge sentenced the peti-
tioner to death.136
The Court rejected petitioner’s argument and held that Florida’s statute 
provided significantly more safeguards to the defendant than did the old 
statute and that the change in the law was not only procedural but also ame-
liorative.137  Although the Dobbert decision addressed procedural concerns, 
128
 See Stevenson, supra note 109, at 1097. 
129
 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258. 
130
 Id. at 247.  
131
 See Cochran, supra note 9, at 1423. 
132
 Id; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (“The Georgia 
Legislature has plainly made an effort to guide the jury in the exercise of its discretion, while at the 
same time permitting the jury to dispense mercy on the basis of factors too intangible to write into a 
statute, and I cannot accept the naked assertion that the effort is bound to fail.”).     
133
 Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). 
134
 Id. at 287.  
135
 Id. at 287, (After weighing the aggravating against the mitigating factors, the jury by a 10-to-2 
majority found sufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh any aggravating circumstances).   
136
 Id. The trial judge under his authority overruled the jury's recommendation and sentenced 
petitioner to death.  In his written findings of fact, the judge provided detailed circumstances of some of 
the horrors inflicted upon the victims.  Id. at 285, 287. 
137
 Id. at 294-97. 
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the Court made declaration worthy of noting.  The Court asserted that with 
the new Florida statute “[d]eath [was] not automatic . . . as it was under the 
old procedure.”138  As this Comment will address, this single disinclination 
is vital.139
In Barclay v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court responded to challenges 
arguing that certain factors may not be taken into consideration by the “sen-
tencer” when deciding whether to impose the death penalty.140  Elwood Bar-
clay challenged the imposition of the death penalty when one of the “aggra-
vating circumstances” relied upon by the trial judge to support the sentence 
was not among those established by the Florida death penalty statute.141
During the post sentencing hearing, the jury rendered an advisory sentence 
recommending that Barclay be sentenced to life imprisonment.142  The trial 
judge, overriding the jury’s recommendation, concluded that “[t]here are 
sufficient and great aggravating circumstances which exist to justify the 
sentence of death . . . .”143
Barclay argued that the trial judge improperly used his criminal record 
as an “aggravating circumstance.”144  The Court held that “the trial judge's 
consideration of Barclay's criminal record as an aggravating circumstance 
was improper as a matter of state law [because] that record did not fall 
within the definition of any statutory aggravating circumstance, and Florida 
law prohibits consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances.”145
However, the Court, citing Proffitt, held that irrespective of the violation of 
state statute, “it [was] clear that [the plurality in Proffitt] saw no constitu-
tional defect in a sentence based on both statutory and nonstatutory aggra-
vating circumstances.”146
In 1994, the Court again examined Florida’s capital punishment sen-
tencing scheme in Spaziano v. Florida.147  This time, when confronted with 
the challenges brought forth by the petitioner under the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments, the Court conducted a lengthy analysis.148  The 
petitioner argued that the statute, which allows a judge to override a jury’s 
recommendation of life in prison, violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohi-
138
 Id. at 295. 
139
 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
140
 Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983).   
141
 Id. at 941-42. 
142
 Id. at 944. 
143
 Id. at 945. 
144
 Id. at 956. 
145
 Id.
146
 Id. at 957.  The Court also noted that neither the Eighth Amendment nor Florida law prohibited 
the admissibility of Barclay’s criminal record.  Id. at 956.   
147 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). 
148
 See Stevenson, supra note 109, at 1099.    
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bition against cruel and unusual punishment, because the jury’s verdict of 
life should be final.   
Furthermore, the override practice violated the Fifth Amendment’s 
Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.149  The petitioner urged that the practice of a judge overriding 
a jury’s recommendation violated the Sixth Amendment and the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.150  In framing his Sixth Amend-
ment claim, the petitioner was careful to limit his argument only to when a 
judge overrode a jury recommendation and not to all capital sentencing 
schemes that did not require a jury’s decision.151
The United States Supreme Court rejected all of the challenges.152  The 
Court acknowledged that while 
[a] capital sentencing is like a trial in the respects significant to the 
Double Jeopardy Clause [this] does not mean that it is like a trial in 
respects significant to the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial. 
. . .  [T]he sentencer, whether judge or jury, has a constitutional obliga-
tion to evaluate the unique circumstances of the individual defendant   
. . . .
153
Furthermore, the Court also held that, “[t]he Sixth Amendment . . . has 
[never] guarantee[d] the . . . right to a jury determination [on a capital sen-
tencing proceeding].”154
In response to the petitioner’s argument that the laws and practice in 
most of the States recognized that juries and not judges were better 
equipped to make reliable capital-sentencing decisions, the Court noted that 
while “a majority of jurisdictions have adopted a different practice [that 
alone] does not establish that contemporary standards of decency are of-
fended by the jury override.”155
149
 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 457-58.  Petitioner Spaziano was indicted, tried and found guilty of first-
degree murder.  The sentencing hearing was before the same jury, a majority of the jury recommended 
life imprisonment.  The trial court concluded that the mitigating circumstances were insufficient to 
outweigh the aggravating circumstances and imposed a sentence of death.  Id. at 450-52. 
150
 Id. at 458. 
151
 Id.
152
 Id. at 449. 
153
 Id. at 459. 
154
 Id.
155
 Id. at 464.  In support of his argument, petitioner indicated “30 out of 37 jurisdictions with a 
capital sentencing statute give the life-or-death decision to the jury, with only 3 of the remaining 7 
allowing a judge to override a jury's recommendation of life.” Id. at 463.  The Court responded to peti-
tioner’s support by indicating that the “Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a 
conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws. Al-
though the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us 
ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment” is violated by a challenged practice.” Id. (internal 
citation omitted). 
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In addressing Florida’s capital sentencing statute, the Supreme Court 
found the statute’s application ensured that penalties were not being im-
posed in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner since the statute had 
“struck a reasonable balance between sensitivity to the individual and his 
circumstances.”156  The Court further noted that “the responsibility on a trial 
judge to impose the sentence in a capital case is [not] so fundamentally at 
odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency that Florida must 
be required to alter its scheme and give final authority to the jury to make 
the life-or-death decision.”157
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Spaziano called into question Florida’s “tri-
furcated procedure for identifying the persons . . . who shall be sentenced to 
death.”158  The dissent noted that although Florida’s sentencing procedure 
was “adopted by a democratically elected legislature,” its validity had been 
presumed.159  However, this presumption may not be conclusive.160  Justice 
Stevens suggested that the jury and not the judge may be better suited to 
make the determination as to the appropriate level of punishment given that 
the death penalty is an expression of the community’s outrage which is 
“qualitatively different from any other punishment.”161
At the time Spaziano was before the Court, only 3 of the 37 jurisdic-
tions with capital sentencing schemes allowed a judge to override a jury’s 
recommendation of life.162  The Court in Gregg noted that evolving social 
standards affected juries in their decision to impose the death penalty,163 and 
the dissent in Spaziano recommended that a representative of the commu-
nity should be given the responsibility for making the life or death determi-
nation.164  Collectively, the Gregg and Spaziano decisions established that 
156
 Id.
157
 Id. at 465.   
158
 Id. at 470 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning who should determine whether an individual is 
sentenced to death—a judge or jury—was premised on the Eighth’s Amendment Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause).  This issue concerning Florida’s hybrid sentencing scheme continues today albeit 
under a Sixth Amendment right.  See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 703 (2002) (Anstead, C.J., 
concurring) (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589) (“requiring findings of fact by a jury of sentenc-
ing factors that may affect the ultimate penalty and sentence [applies] to death penalty cases.”).            
159
 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 471 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
160
 Id.  (noting that the Eighth Amendment as envisioned by the Framers acts as safeguard against 
punishment undertaken by the Government “in a manner inconsistent with a fundamental value”, albeit 
with a legislative majority.). 
161
 Id. at 469 ((Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[E]very Member of this Court has written  . . . endorsing 
the proposition that because of its  severity and irrevocability, the death penalty is . . . different . . . and 
hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it is a justified response to a given 
offense.”).       
162
 Id. at 463 (Petitioner pointed out to the Court that 30 out of 37 jurisdictions with capital sen-
tencing schemes allow a jury to make the life or death determination.).       
163 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-82 (1976). 
164
 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J. dissenting).  
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while society as a whole concurs with the existence of capital punishment, 
the structure of how to impose death is open to experimentation.165
Complying with the notion that the death penalty is closely related to 
society’s view, Justice Stevens argued for “a more focused inquiry into the 
Eighth Amendment implications of the decision to put an accused to death, 
and the jury’s relationship to those implications.”166  As cases involving 
sentencing schemes have come before the Court, the struggle with a mecha-
nism in which elements of a crime are decided by a jury and sentencing 
factors are determined by a judge continue to surface.167  Whether sentenc-
ing factors are elements which must be decided by a jury and not a judge 
will be determined by the Court in the future.  Justice Stevens’ request in 
Spaziano, calling for a more focused inquiry as to the jury’s role in sentenc-
ing, will be fulfilled as the Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence de-
velops. 
Florida’s death penalty statute has continued to survive challenges as 
seen when Paul C. Hildwin, Jr. appealed his conviction for first-degree 
murder and the death sentence imposed by the trial court.168  The Florida 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision and did not discuss Hild-
win’s argument that the death penalty statute violated the Sixth Amendment 
because the jury was not required to provide the judge with specific find-
ings as to the aggravating factors.169
After an unsuccessful challenge before the Florida Supreme Court,170
Hildwin was granted certiorari; once again, the United States Supreme 
Court was to evaluate Florida’s death penalty statute.  However, this time 
the argument was framed around the Sixth Amendment’s right to jury trial 
rather than an Eighth Amendment claim.171
During the trial phase, the defendant was found guilty, and thus a sepa-
rate sentencing proceeding was held.172  During that proceeding, the jury 
unanimously recommended the imposition of the death penalty and the 
judge concurred, submitting in writing the findings upon which the sen-
tence of death was based.173  Despite the defendant’s contention that the 
Sixth Amendment required the jury and not the judge to submit the findings 
165
 Id. at 464; Gregg, 468 U.S. at 195. 
166
 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 477. 
167
 Julia Marcelle Foy Hilliker, The Evolving Meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments: Sen-
tencing Effects of Aggravating Factors as Elements of the Crime, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 408 
(2004).      
168 Hildwin v. State, 531 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam). 
169
 Hildwin, 490 U.S. 638 (although the jury’s recommendation was unanimous, Hildwin argued 
that the statute was unconstitutional because the statute authorizes the judge’s, and not the jury’s find-
ings of fact to determine the sentence).     
170
 Hildwin, 531 So. 2d 124.  
171
 Hildwin, 490 U.S. 638. 
172
 Id.
173
 Id. at 639. 
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of fact,174 the Court again upheld Florida’s sentencing system and held that 
the Sixth Amendment did not bar a judge from making the ultimate deter-
mination.175
The Court based its decision in this case on the principles established 
in Spaziano—a judge’s imposition of the death penalty on an individual, 
notwithstanding the jury’s recommendation for life, comported with the 
Sixth Amendment.176  In essence, the right to a jury trial did not attach to a 
capital sentencing hearing.177  The Court went on to establish that the sen-
tencing scheme operated solely to guide the judge in selecting a penalty 
within a range already established by the legislature; and thus the aggravat-
ing factor was not an element of the offense.178  Faced with a Sixth Amend-
ment challenge, the Hildwin Court applied Spaziano as well as the rationale 
of McMillian v. Pennsylvania.179  These cases recognized and distinguished 
a state’s legislative power to define the elements of a crime, which are re-
quired to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, from prohibited activity, 
which exposes a defendant to criminal sanctions and is not an element of 
the crime.180  The Supreme Court would later recognize that Hildwin was 
“the first case to deal expressly with fact-finding necessary to authorize 
imposition of the more severe of alternative sentences.”181
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme was not the only judge/jury verdict 
system to be constitutionally challenged.  In Baldwin v. Alabama, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment was not vio-
lated when the judge imposed a sentence of death irrespective of the jury’s 
verdict.182  The basis of the argument was that the judge relied on a jury’s 
recommendation imposing the death penalty when the jury made the deci-
sion under a later repealed statute that provided no guidance and permitted 
it to return a sentence of death along with its guilty verdict.183  Citing 
Spaziano, the Court held that it was “unwilling to say that there is any one 
right way for a State to set up its capital-sentencing scheme.184
174
 Id.
175
 Id. at 639-41 (noting that the Florida Supreme Court rejected Hildwin’s argument that a jury 
and not a judge should determine the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors without discussion 
holding that that claim had no merit and ultimately held that the judge’s findings were supported by the 
evidence).  
176
 Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640-41 (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984)).   
177 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459. 
178
 Id. at 640 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)) (recognizing that the state 
through its sentencing act which exposed a defendant to an increase in his sentence had not created a 
separate offense which required a jury finding as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, state legislatures 
had the power to determine the elements of a crime and the corresponding burden of proof).     
179
 McMillan, 477 U.S. 79, 86-88, 93 (1986). 
180
 Id.
181
 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 250 (1999).        
182
 Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 389 (1985).  
183
 Id. at 373 n.1, 378.    
184
 Id. at 389.  
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Furthermore, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed that the death sen-
tence was not unconstitutional because “the sentencing procedure was 
saved by the fact that it was the trial judge who was the true sentencing 
authority, and he considered aggravating and mitigating circumstances be-
fore imposing sentence.”185
Similar to Florida’s sentencing scheme where the jury renders a rec-
ommendation, Ohio’s death penalty statute was upheld by the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Greer v. Mitchell.186  The defendant argued that permit-
ting the jury to only recommend a sentence as opposed to imposing a sen-
tence would “minimize the jury’s sense of responsibility for determining the 
appropriateness of death.”187  To marginalize a juror’s sense of responsibil-
ity the defendant claimed violated the Eighth Amendment as the U.S. Su-
preme Court had held in Caldwell v. Mississippi.188  The Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals distinguished Caldwell by asserting that the jury in Greer was in 
fact mindful of its role irrespective that the ultimate decision as to whether 
the defendant was sentenced to life or death is imposed solely by the 
court.189
In keeping with the principal concerns pertaining to pre-Furman impo-
sition of death penalties, the United States Supreme Court continued to hold 
that a sentencing scheme which provided an advisory recommendation to 
the judge was valid and that the judge need only consider the jury’s recom-
mendation to adequately prevent arbitrary and capricious sentencing.190
Under a challenge to Alabama’s capital sentencing structure, the Supreme 
Court in Harris rejected the defendant’s arguments that the Eighth Amend-
ment required the judge to give “great weight” to the jury’s advisory rec-
ommendation sentence.191  The Court, by way of the Spaziano precedent, 
held that although the judge was required to place great weight upon the 
jury’s recommendation: “[T]he Constitution permits the trial judge, acting 
alone, to impose a capital sentence.”192  Furthermore, the Court re-stated the 
“hallmark” of the constitutional analysis with regard to the imposition of 
185
 Id. at 379 (“If the jury’s ‘sentence’ were indeed the dispositive sentence, the Alabama scheme 
would be unconstitutional.”). 
186
 Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2001).    
187
 Id. at 684, 687.  
188 Id.  Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323, 340-41 (1985) (noting that a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment occurs when the determination of the death penalty rests with a sentencer who has 
been led to believe that accountability for determining appropriateness of defendant’s death rests some-
where else). 
189
 Greer, 264 F.3d at 684, 687. 
190
 Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 511 (1995). 
191
 Id.    
192
 Id. at 515.  The Court noted that ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (e) (1994), capital sentencing scheme 
was similar to Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, FLA. STAT. §. 921.141(3) (1985).  However, the two 
States differed in as much as the Florida Supreme Court has held that the trial judge must give “great 
weight” to the jury’s recommendation.  Id. at 508-09.  
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death in the hands of the state: the “[statutory] scheme [must] adequately 
channel[] the sentencer’s discretion so as to prevent arbitrary results.”193
As can be seen by the foregoing cases, Florida’s capital sentencing 
scheme, as well as those similar in procedure, were victorious when chal-
lenged before the United States Supreme Court under several constitutional 
grounds.  Under the Supreme Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence, a 
state’s “sentencing scheme [must] adequately channel[] the sentencer’s dis-
cretion so as to prevent arbitrary results.”194  Regardless of this requirement, 
Florida’s Supreme Court case law created the Tedder standard; an extra 
layer of protection triggered only when the court overrode a jury’s advisory 
sentence.195  In essence, the standard requires that “to sustain a sentence of 
death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sen-
tence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reason-
able person could differ.”196
Though the Constitution is not offended by a sentencing scheme that 
permits the judge to decide the final imposition of a death sentence,197 other 
states have followed Florida’s lead and adopted the Tedder standard.198  In 
addition to following Florida’s scheme, other states have defended their 
own states sentencing scheme by asserting Florida’s capital sentencing 
structure and its similarities to theirs.199  Arizona successfully utilized Flor-
ida’s “Supreme Court” approved sentencing scheme in Walton to support its 
argument; however, as this Comment will later discuss, the decision in 
Walton would perhaps mark the beginning of a change in how the United 
States Supreme Court would view sentencing factors versus elements of a 
crime in light of the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial.200
193
 Id. at 511.     
194
 Id.
195
 Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975) (per curiam). 
196 Id. at  910. 
197
 Harris, 513 U.S. at 511; see also Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464 (holding that no federal constitu-
tional right exist to jury sentencing even for a capital offense).    
198
 Michael F. McTaggart, Criminal Law: 2003 Delaware Supreme Court Decisions, 7 DEL. L.
REV 89, 98 (2004), (noting that the Delaware Supreme Court in applying the Tedder standard in Pennell 
v. State, 604 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1992) had in essence adopted established Florida capital punishment 
jurisprudence); see also John M. Richardson, Reforming the Jury Override System: Protecting Capital 
Defendant’s Rights by Returning to the System’s Original Purpose, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 455 
(2004) (recognizing the Tedder standard overrides the scheme as it is currently administered in Florida 
and Alabama, which raises real policy and constitutional concerns). 
199
 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-48 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002).  
200
 See infra, at page 135, section entitled “The Turning Point for Judicially Imposed Sentences,” 
which points out that while Arizona was successful in its argument before the Supreme Court specifi-
cally through the precedent of Hildwin, as well as noting that Florida’s and Arizona’s sentencing 
schemes were similar, the Supreme Court would ultimately hold Arizona’s sentencing statute unconstitu-
tional in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  See also Walton, 497 U.S. 639 at 710-11 (Stevens, J. 
dissenting) (noting that the history of trial by jury in criminal cases as well as English common law, held 
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In Walton v. Arizona, the Court held that death penalty aggravating 
factors were sentencing factors, and not elements of a crime; therefore, a 
finding of fact, on the aggravating factors did not constitutionally require a 
jury determination.201  Walton was convicted of first-degree murder when 
the jury determined that Walton had robbed, abducted and shot the victim 
with a .22 caliber derringer gun once in the back of the head after driving 
him to the middle of the desert.202  At trial, the medical examiner testified 
that the victim had survived the gunshot, regained consciousness, and ulti-
mately died from dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia approximately a 
day before his body was found.203  Similar to the process in Florida, the trial 
judge conducted a separate sentencing hearing required by Arizona’s sen-
tencing scheme.204
Whereas Florida’s system calls for a jury to provide an advisory rec-
ommendation, Arizona permitted the judge alone to determine the existence 
or nonexistence of any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances as 
proscribed by Arizona State Statute § 13-703, subsections (F) and (G).205
During the post-trial sentencing process, the court found two aggravating 
circumstances were present206 and that “no mitigating circumstances suffi-
ciently substantial to call for leniency” were present.207 Walton was sen-
tenced to death.208
Since the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had 
found Arizona’s death penalty statute to be unconstitutional,209 the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.210  Walton's Sixth Amend-
ment argument articulated that a jury, not a judge, had to make all findings 
of fact effecting the sentencing decision; moreover, Arizona’s death penalty 
that the “[jury]. . . [a]s fact-finder . . . had the power to determine not only whether the defendant was 
guilty of homicide but also the degree of the offense.”).
201
 Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-48. 
202
 Id. at 644.  
203
 Id. at 644-45. 
204
 See id. at 647-49; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1989).   
205
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1989) (Subsection (F) defines 10 aggravating circumstances 
that may be considered; subsection (G) defines mitigating circumstances as any factors ‘which are 
relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than death, including any aspect of the defen-
dant’s character, propensities or record and any of the circumstances of the offense, including but not 
limited to” five specified factors). 
206
 Walton, 497 U.S. at 646 (The two aggravating factors found were (1) the murder was commit-
ted in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner, § 13-703 (F)(6), and (2) the murder was commit-
ted for pecuniary gain. § 13-703 (F)(5)).     
207
 See Walton, 497 U.S. at 646. 
208
 Id. at 655-56.   
209 See Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1023 (1988) (holding that the Arizona statutory 
scheme for imposing the death penalty erroneously lists elements of the offense as factors to be deter-
mined by the sentencing judge, and thus deprives a person of his right to a jury decision on the elements 
of the crime and is therefore in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments).   
210
 Walton, 497 U.S. at 639.     
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statute would be constitutional if a judge would impose a sentence based on 
a jury’s decision as to what aggravating and mitigating circumstances are 
present.211  The Supreme Court rejected Walton’s argument and held “[a]ny 
argument that the Constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence of 
death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has 
been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court.”212
Florida’s capital punishment scheme played a vital role in the Walton
decision as evidenced by the Court’s use of the standard established in 
Proffitt, Spaziano and Hildwin; reaffirming that the Sixth Amendment did 
not require a jury to identify the aggravating factors that permit the imposi-
tion of capital punishment.213  When Walton attempted to distinguish Flor-
ida’s system from that of Arizona’s, the Court made a compelling assess-
ment of the two capital sentencing schemes,  
. . . Florida[’s] jury recommends a sentence, but it does not make spe-
cific factual findings with regard to the existence of mitigating or ag-
gravating circumstances and its recommendation is not binding on the 
trial judge. A Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury's 
findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues than does a trial 
judge in Arizona.214
The Court kept aggravating factors out of the jury’s reach by classify-
ing them as mere standards that guide a judge when choosing between the 
alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment and not as elements of 
an offense that require jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt.215
Walton’s challenge as to what constituted an element of a crime as op-
posed to an aggravating factor was the not the first challenge of its kind.216
When confronted with this determination the United States Supreme Court 
deferred to the power of a state’s legislature to make the determination.217
By relying on McMillan, which did not involve a capital sentencing 
scheme, the United States Supreme Court addressed a fundamental issue 
surrounding various challenges to capital punishment sentencing schemes: 
“there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sen-
tence turns on specific findings of fact.”218
McMillan established that the state could not only determine what was 
an element of a crime and its related burden of proof to be found by a jury, 
but could also establish what constituted a sentencing factor, which placed 
211
 Id.
212
 Id.
213
 Id. at 647-48 (citing Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Spaziano, 468 U.S. 447; Hildwin, 490 U.S. 638).   
214
 Id. at 648. 
215
 See id. at 649-50. 
216
 McMillan, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).  
217
 See Hilliker, supra note 167, at 408.   
218
 See McMillian, 477 U.S. at 93.  
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the decision-making in the hands of the court.219  Justice Stevens, dissenting 
and filing a separate opinion in a 5-4 decision, argued that there should be 
some constitutional limit that permits a legislative declaration which pre-
scribes conduct and is not an element of a crime.220  This, Stevens empha-
sized, would undermine the significance of the reasonable-doubt standard 
as well as the Constitution itself.221
Throughout his dissenting opinions, Justice Stevens has remained con-
sistent in advocating that constitutional limitations require a jury and not 
the court to determine the proper sentence when determinations of fact 
needed to be made.222  Justice Stevens was certain that the Sixth Amend-
ment required that a jury must establish the determination of facts before 
the death penalty may be imposed.223  Recent jurisprudence supports Justice 
Stevens’ steadfast position.  
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT EVALUATES SENTENCING 
CONSIDERATIONS
One year after holding that sentencing considerations that increase a 
statutory maximum penalty do not absolutely trigger constitutional consid-
erations,224 the Court reversed itself and concluded that facts which trigger 
an increase in maximum sentences need to be submitted to a jury and 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.225  In Almendarez-Torres, the defendant 
illegally re-entered the United States after being convicted of a crime and 
deported.226  Pursuant to a penalty provision,227 a court was able to impose a 
219
 Id.
220
 See id. 95-103 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (fearing that the majority’s decision could undermine the 
Constitution, Justice Stevens argued that “conduct which exposes a criminal defendant to greater . . . 
punishment” requires the Due Process protection; fearing that the majority decisions could undermine 
the Constitution).   
221
 Id. at 102.  
222
 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 467-80 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (calling for heightened procedural safeguards because death penalty is qualitatively 
different from any other punishment that a representative cross section of the community must be given 
the responsibility for making that decision); McMillan 477 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“A state 
legislature may not dispense with the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conduct that it 
targets for severe criminal penalties.”); Walton, 497 U.S. at 712 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The guaran-
tees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment”); Harris v. Alabama, 
513 U.S. 504, 526 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court today casts a cloud over the legitimacy of 
our capital sentencing jurisprudence.”). 
223
 Id.
224 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
225
 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252 (1999). 
226
 Almendarez-Torres , 523 U.S. at 226. 
227
 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326 (b)(2) (authorized a court to impose a maximum prison term of 20 years for 
“any alien described” in subsection (a), if the initial “deportation was subsequent to a conviction for 
commission of an aggravated felony.”)    
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higher sentence when a defendant, with a prior conviction unlawfully re-
entered the United States after deportation.228
In the opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court established that 
the statute permitting the government to determine the proper sentence was 
in fact a sentencing provision and not an element of crime.229  The Court 
looked to Congress and the “statute’s language, structure, subject matter, 
context, and history” when determining the difference between an element 
and a factor.230  However, the Court took a completely different approach 
when deciding Jones v. United States.231 Although factually different,232
Almendarez-Torres and Jones dealt with sentencing factors that were ex-
empt from the requirements of charge and jury verdict.233
The petitioner in Jones was convicted of armed car jacking.234  Under 
the federal statute, anyone convicted of car jacking, absent any aggravating 
factors, could face a maximum prison sentence of fifteen years.235  How-
ever, if any of the enumerated factors were found to be present, the court 
could impose a maximum penalty of twenty-five years.236  The indictment 
simply listed the carjacking offense with a maximum exposure of fifteen 
years in prison.237  During the sentencing phase, the government recom-
mended a sentence of twenty-five years because one of the victims had suf-
fered serious bodily injury.238  The petitioner argued that the higher penalty 
sought by the government was “out of bounds,” since the issue of fact as to 
whether the victims had sustained serious bodily injury was an element of 
the crime and thus needed to be proven before a jury.239
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, distinguished their holding in Almen-
darez-Torres by regarding that prior convictions were the exception to a 
228
 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U. S. at 227. 
229
 Id. at 227 
230
 Id. at 228.  
231
 See Jones, 526 U.S. 227. 
232
 The defendant in Jones was convicted of car-jacking; a violent felony involving the use of a 
firearm.  Id. at 229-31.  The defendant in Almendarez-Torres, however, illegally re-entered the United 
States after being deported, and no violence was implicated.  Id. at 227.      
233
 Id. at 229. 
234
 Id.    
235
 Id. at 230.  
236
 Id. at 230; 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988 ed., Supp. V) The statute states in relevant part: 
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title, takes a motor vehicle that has 
been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or pres-
ence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall—(1) be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, (2) if serious bodily injury (as de-
fined in section 1365 of this title) results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 
years, or both, and (3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of 
years up to life, or both.  
237
 Jones, 526 U.S. at 230.  
238
 Id. at 231. 
239
 Id.
2007] Evaluating Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme  125
rule that “facts establishing higher penalties must be treated procedurally 
similar to offense elements.”240  The Court, rejecting the statute’s form over 
its substance and treating what appeared to be sentencing factors as ele-
ments of a crime, established the “maximum penalty test.”241 To determine 
whether a fact is a sentencing factor or an element of the crime, the Court 
looked to whether “the finding of such a fact would increase the maximum 
penalty available for that crime.”242
The dissent asserted that this decision would cause a “disruption and 
uncertainty in the sentencing systems of the States.”243  The dissent ques-
tioned the holding in Walton,244 by noting that whereas a judge’s findings 
may increase the punishment for murder to death, “it is constitutionally 
impermissible to allow a judge’s finding to increase the maximum punish-
ment for carjacking by 10 years.245  The ruling and proposition put forth by 
the holding in Jones called into question judicially-imposed sentences and 
transformed the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.246
THE TURNING POINT FOR JUDICIALLY IMPOSED SENTENCES
On March 28, 2000, when the Supreme Court heard arguments on Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey, the predictions made by the Walton dissenters proved 
to be accurate.247  The petitioner was arrested and charged for firing shots 
into the home of an African-American family.248  While Charles Apprendi 
was subsequently indicted on numerous charges as well as the unlawful 
possession of a firearm, the state accepted a plea of guilty on two counts of 
second-degree possession of a firearm and one count of unlawful posses-
sion of a bomb.249  The statute for possession of a firearm carried a sentenc-
ing range of five to ten years.250  However, under a separate New Jersey 
“hate crime” statute, a judge could impose an extended imprisonment term 
240
 Id. 230-35; see Douglas A. Berman, The Roots and Reality of Blakely, 19 CRIM. JUST. 5, 9 
(2005).    
241
 See Hilliker, supra note 167, at 410.  
242
 Id.
243 Jones, at 271 (Kennedy, J.; O’Connor, J.; Rehnquist, J.; Breyer, J. dissenting).  The dissent’s 
fear of disruption among sentencing guidelines would eventually come true.  See United States v. 
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), discussed below.   
244
 Walton, 497 U.S. 639 (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to determine 
the aggravating factors which permit the imposition of capital punishment). 
245
 Jones, 526 U.S. at 272 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the Court should have chosen 
Walton for its new approach).  
246
 Jason E. Barsanti, Ring v. Arizona: The Sixth and Eighth Amendments Collide: Out of the 
Wreckage Emerges a Constitutional Safeguard for Capital Defendants, 31 PEPP. L. REV 519, 537 (2004).   
247
 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).   
248
 Id. at 469 (although this statement was later retracted, the petitioner had stated that he did not 
want the family in his neighborhood because of their race).         
249
 Id. at 469-70.     
250
 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C: 39-4(a) and 43-6(a)(2) (West 1995). 
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if evidence demonstrated that a defendant committed a crime with the pur-
pose to “intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, 
color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.”251
After accepting the petitioner’s plea, the trial judge conducted an evi-
dentiary hearing on the issue of Apprendi’s purpose in committing the 
crime and concluded that “that the crime was motivated by racial bias.”252
Based on the “hate crime” statute that permitted a judicially imposed en-
hancement, Apprendi was sentenced to a term of twelve years.253  Supported 
on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, Apprendi appealed his 
sentence arguing that the finding of bias upon which his hate crime sen-
tence was based must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.254
Had the hate crime enhancement not been triggered, Apprendi would have 
been exposed to a maximum sentence of five to ten years.255  Based on 
precedents such as McMillan256 and Almendarez-Torres,257 New Jersey took 
the position that the enhancement statute was a sentencing factor as op-
posed to an element of the crime.258
However, the United States Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice 
Stevens, implemented the “maximum penalty test” and rejected the State’s 
argument, holding that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any 
fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a 
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”259  The Court also noted that, as applied to state 
laws, the Fourteenth Amendment mandated the same response.260  In ana-
lyzing the issues, the Court relied heavily on the historical foundation and 
recognition of the guarantee in all criminal prosecutions of the right to a 
public trial by an impartial jury.261  While re-affirming the Almendarez-
Torres ruling to permit prior convictions, the Court distinguished McMillan
by asserting that the statute in McMillan involved a statute that “only 
raise[d] the minimum sentence that may be imposed and neither alter[ed] 
251
 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 469.  See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (authorizing the trial court to 
impose an extended sentencing term if the defendant is found to have committed the crime with intent to 
“intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, 
sexual orientation or ethnicity”).   
252
 Id. at 471.   
253
 Id.
254
 Id. at 471.  
255
 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C: 39-4(a) (West 1995). 
256
 McMillan, 477 U.S. 79. 
257
 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224. 
258
 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492.     
259
 Id. at 476. 
260
 Id.
261
 Id. at 478.  
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the maximum sentence nor create[d] a separate offense calling for a sepa-
rate penalty.”262
As the dissenters’ had predicted in Walton, Justice O’Connor dis-
sented, responding that the decision in Apprendi “[would] surely be re-
membered as a watershed change in constitutional law.”263By carving out an 
exception to capital punishment jurisprudence, the Court was able to distin-
guish and maintain intact the prior decision in Walton, although the door 
was now wide open for continued evolution regarding capital punishment 
and the Sixth Amendment.264
Twelve years after its holding in Walton which accepted the Arizona 
death penalty system,265 the Court revisited Arizona’s capital punishment 
statute, and on June 24, 2002, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Arizona statute violated the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial.266  In 
Ring v. Arizona,267 the petitioner was tried and found guilty of felony mur-
der occurring in the commission of an armed robbery.268  Arizona’s capital 
punishment sentencing scheme prescribed that the petitioner could only be 
sentenced to death if a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing 
made further findings.269 It was during this separate sentencing hearing that 
the judge had to determine the presence of statutorily enumerated aggravat-
ing circumstances and/or mitigating circumstances.270  To impose the death 
penalty, the court, sitting alone, needed only to find one aggravating cir-
cumstance and no mitigating circumstances “sufficiently substantial to call 
for leniency.”271
As a result of the separate sentencing hearing, the judge sentenced the 
petitioner to death.272  Ring appealed arguing that Arizona’s capital sentenc-
ing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial by allowing 
a judicially imposed sentence that raises a defendant’s maximum penalty.273
In applying the “maximum penalty test” as created and later put to use in 
Apprendi,274 the Court concluded that under Arizona law, the “death sen-
tence [could] not [be] legally . . . imposed . . . unless at least one aggravat-
ing factor is found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.”275  Therefore, the 
262
 Id. at 486; McMillian, 477 U.S. at 90; see also Barsanti, supra note 246, at 539.    
263
 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
264
 Id. at 523. 
265
 See Walton, 497 U.S. 639. 
266
 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002).    
267
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268
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269
 ARIZ. STAT. REV. § 13-703 (2001).   
270
 See Ring, 536 U.S. 584.   
271
 ARIZ. STAT. REV. § 13-703 (2001) 
272
 See Ring, 536 U.S. 584.    
273
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274
 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 490. 
275
 Ring, 536 U.S. at 597.     
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aggravating factor could not be established by the judge under the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee, applicable to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment; it required that a jury determine the aggravating factor.276
The State of Arizona argued that the aggravating factors were only 
sentencing factors, providing a sentencing range between death or life im-
prisonment and that Ring was sentenced within the range of punishment 
authorized by the jury verdict.277  The Court rejected this argument and 
pointed out that by cross-referencing the statute to a statutory provision that 
required a finding of an aggravating circumstance prior to the imposition of 
death, “Arizona’[s] first-degree murder statute authorizes a maximum pen-
alty of death only in a formal sense.”278  Arizona expressed that the judi-
cially determinative factors were designed to overcome “the arbitrary impo-
sition of the death penalty.”279  The Court countered by declaring that while 
the pursuit of fairness was admirable, it was not decisive in overriding the 
jury trial right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.280
By applying the principles of Apprendi to capital punishment, the 
Court overruled Walton and continued to expand its statutory analysis with 
judicially imposed sentencing by maintaining that, “[i]f a State makes an 
increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding 
of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it--must be found by a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”281  One can truly gauge the Court’s devel-
oping jurisprudence with regards to sentencing factors and constitutionally 
protected limitations with a concurring opinion in Ring by Justice Scalia 
who, in Walton v. Arizona, had upheld the state’s sentencing scheme: 
“[s]ince Walton, I have acquired new wisdom[,] . . . to put it more critically, 
[I] have discarded old ignorance.282
THE SUPREME COURT CONTINUES TO ACQUIRE NEW WISDOM 
The Court had an opportunity to expand its previous rulings in Ap-
prendi and Ring when it granted certiorari in Blakely v. Washington.283  In 
Blakely, the petitioner was arrested for abducting his estranged wife by 
binding her with duct tape and forcing her at knifepoint into a wooden box 
276
 Id.
277
 Id. at 603-04.  
278
 Ring, 536 U.S. at 585. 
279
 Ring, 536 U.S. at 607.  Recall that the Furman decision required the states to provide statutory 
factors, which provide the sentencer guidance in the sentencing process.  
280
 Id.
281
 Id. at 585-86.  See also Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The Supreme 
Court and The Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U.. L. REV. 1475, 1485 (2002) (noting that the delay of the Court 
to apply the Apprendi principle to all capital punishment sentencing schemes put into doubt the sup-
posed Eighth Amendment principle of “heightened reliability” applicable to capital cases).                      
282
 Ring, 536 U.S. at 611 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
283
 See Blakely, 542 U.S. 296. 
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in the bed of his pickup truck.284  The petitioner subsequently plead guilty to 
second-degree kidnapping, a class B felony which, based on the admitted 
facts of the plea, exposed him to a maximum sentence of 53 months.285
However, under Washington law, a judge was permitted to sentence above 
the standard range if during the sentencing phase, the judge, sitting alone, 
made a finding of fact as to the presence of statutorily enumerated aggravat-
ing factors.286 After a three day bench hearing, the judge determined that the 
petitioner had acted with deliberate cruelty and imposed a 90-month sen-
tence, almost twice the sentence from what the admitted facts of the plea 
exposed him to.287  The petitioner’s argued that the sentencing procedure 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.288
The Court was quick to point out that the case required the application 
of the rule developed in Apprendi:289 “[o]ther than the fact of a prior convic-
tion, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.”290  Washington argued that since the applicable statutory 
maximum for a class B felony was ten years, and not 53 months, Blakely’s 
sentence was not beyond the statutory maximum and therefore Apprendi
did not apply.291
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, rejected Washington’s statutory 
maximum argument and clarified that the statutory maximum was, “the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts re-
flected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant,” for Apprendi pur-
poses.292 Relying on constitutional structure and noting that the Framers put 
a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution, the majority illustrated that the 
jury was vested with “rightful control in the judicial department” and that 
the source of a judge’s authority to sentence came from the jury’s verdict.293
In reversing the Washington Court of Appeals holding, the Court instructed 
the state to submit its accusations to “the unanimous suffrage of twelve of 
[Blakeley’s] equals and neighbors.294
The dissent argued that Washington had implemented a system of 
guided discretion in order to afford equal protection to combat racial dispar-
284
 Id. at 298. 
285
 Id. at 298-99 
286
 Id.
287
 Id. at 300. 
288
 Id. at 301. 
289
 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466. 
290
 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301. 
291
 Id. at 303; WASH. REV. CODE  §§ 9A.20.021(1)(b) (West 2000).   
292
 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. 
293
 Id. at 306 (noting that without the authority from the jury’s verdict, the Framer’s intent in the 
Sixth Amendment would be lost).   
294
 Id. at 313-14. 
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ity because of unstructured review.295  Furthermore, the dissent noted that 
because both criminal history and the character of a defendant were barred 
from the guilt phase of a criminal proceeding for their prejudicial effects, 
the State might incur the additional cost associated with a “full-blown jury” 
in the sentencing phase.296  The dissenters argued that the ruling in Blakely
would impact the Guidelines because judges were permitted to make de-
terminations of fact that increased sentencing ranges beyond the jury ver-
dict alone,297 despite the majority’s protestations to the contrary.298
Merely six months after its holding in Blakely,299 the Court heard ar-
guments on the issue of whether the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
violated the Sixth Amendment since the guidelines allowed judges to im-
pose enhanced sentences based on determinations of facts, other than prior 
convictions.300  In United States v. Booker,301 the petitioner faced a maxi-
mum statutory sentence range of 210-to-262 months when his prior convic-
tion was taken into consideration along with the conviction of possessing at 
least fifty grams of crack cocaine during sentencing.302  However, the peti-
tioner was sentenced to 360 months.303  This increase in sentencing was 
possible since the Guidelines authorized departures from the set sentencing 
range when a judge found aggravating or mitigating circumstances of a 
kind, or to a degree.304
The Court began its analysis by affirming that the applicable sentenc-
ing rules were mandatory on all judges.305  The Court further clarified that 
had the rules been merely advisory, a court’s ability to select a particular 
sentence based on circumstances and facts would not implicate the Sixth 
Amendment.306  The Court concluded that there was no difference between 
the sentence imposed in Blakely and the sentence imposed under the instant 
case, and thus the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were subject to the jury 
trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment.307  The Court maintained that 
the principle for their decision was not “the product of recent innovations,” 
295
 Id. at 318 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
296
 Id. at 319. 
297
 Id. at 325. 
298
 Id. at 305 n.9 (“The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on 
them.”). 
299
 Id. at 296.     
300 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005). 
301
 Id. at 738, 
302
 See generally  id.
303
 Id. at 742 (the court noted that the sentence imposed by the judge was 10 years longer than the 
range supported by the verdict alone).   
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 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (West Supp.2004) (this provision allowed the judge to on a case-
by-case basis evaluate circumstance that may have not been taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission and which should result in a different sentence from those described). 
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 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 742. 
306
 Id.
307
 Id. at 744-45. 
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but was rooted in the “ideals [the] constitution assimilated from the com-
mon law.”308
The majority rejected the dissents contention that the Sentencing 
Guidelines enjoyed a “traditional judicial authority to increase sentences 
[by] . . . taking [into] account . . . any unusual blameworthiness in the man-
ner employed in committing a crime.”309  The majority responded by noting 
that “in today's world,” tradition did not provide a “sound guide to en-
forcement of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial.”310
ANALYSIS 
REVIEWING FLORIDA’S DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING SCHEME IN LIGHT OF 
APPRENDI, RING, BLAKELY AND BOOKER
The string of cases reviewed clearly shows that under the Eighth 
Amendment a state’s capital punishment statute must provide guided dis-
cretion to a jury or sentencer in determining whether the imposition of 
death is applicable.311  Moreover, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, a 
jury must consider aggravating circumstances, other than that the defendant 
was previously convicted, in order to result in the imposition of the maxi-
mum punishment authorized by the verdict.312
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the statutory maxi-
mum, including the imposition of death, as the maximum a defendant is 
exposed to by virtue of the jury’s verdict irrespective of whether the maxi-
mum is attached to the actual crime being charged or a separate statute 
which enhances the punishment.313 Apprendi, Ring, and more recently 
Blakely and Booker clearly indicate the position the United States Supreme 
Court has taken with regard to the imposition of sentences that are not 
solely determined by a jury.  This Comment’s position that Florida’s death 
penalty sentencing scheme is unconstitutional is dependent on several pri-
mary propositions.   
308
 Id. at 753 (the Court emphasized that the Framers feared the threat of “judicial despotism” 
which could occur absent a jury from “arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions”). 
309
 Id. at 751. 
310
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311
 Furman, 408 U.S. 238. 
312
 Id.; Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466; Ring, 536 U.S. 584; Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (These amendments are 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.) 
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 See Ring, 536 U.S. 589-602 (outlining the meaning of statutory maximum, “[a] defendant may 
not be “exposed to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the 
facts reflected in the jury verdict alone . . . [t]his prescription governs. . . even if the State characterizes 
the additional findings made by the judge as “sentencing factors”); the Court further addressed whether 
this definition applied to capital defendants, “Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants . . . 
are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their 
maximum punishment”).  Id at 589.     
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First, the role of the jury in Florida’s sentencing scheme is merely ad-
visory and not determinative.314  Second, under Florida’s sentencing struc-
ture the maximum sentence a judge may impose on a defendant convicted 
of capital murder, solely on the jury’s verdict, is life imprisonment, and not 
death.315  Third, the guidelines placed in the statute such as the weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors in the death penalty sentencing phase is 
mandatory under the mandates of Furman.316  Fourth, the mere presence of 
aggravating factors in and of themselves is not outcome determinative as to 
the imposition of death.317  And fifth, it is the outcome of the balancing of 
opposing factors, aggravating against mitigating, which ultimately deter-
mines whether or not the death penalty is appropriate;318 a role which the 
jury and not the judge should be carrying out.319
THE “TRUE” ROLE OF THE JURY
Florida’s Supreme Court continues to hold that its death penalty sen-
tencing scheme is constitutionally valid.320  In Bottoson v. Moore, Florida’s 
Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the implications of Apprendi
and Ring on Florida’s capital sentencing scheme.321  Linroy Bottoson was 
convicted for first-degree murder and in accordance with the jury’s recom-
mendation, the trial judge sentenced appellant to death.322  During the sen-
tencing phase, the judge imposed the death sentence after determining the 
presence of the following aggravating circumstances: petitioner had previ-
ously been convicted of a violent crime; the murder was committed during 
the commission of a felony and for the purpose of avoiding arrest; and that 
the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”323  The trial judge 
found no mitigating circumstances.324
While Bottoson was unsuccessful in his appeals to Florida’s Supreme 
Court under a writ of habeas corpus, the United States Supreme Court post-
poned his execution while it decided Ring.325  On June 28, 2002, after decid-
314
 See supra note 95, (the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court).    
315 FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (3) (West 2003). 
316 Furman, 408 U.S. 238. 
317
 FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (3) (West 2003). 
318 Id.
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 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (holding that statutory maximum is the maximum a judge may 
impose without additional findings).  See also Ring, 536 U.S. 584 (the Court applied Apprendi to capital 
sentencing scheme); Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (holding that additional facts a judged found under a sen-
tencing scheme which was mandatory and restricted judicial discretion when imposing sentences vio-
lates the Sixth Amendment). 
320
 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002).  See Hilliker, supra note 167, at 432.    
321
 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002). 
322
 Bottoson v. State, 443 So.2d 962, 963 (Fla. 1983). 
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 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 695.    
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ing Ring, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bottoson’s 
case, which in turn ended the stay on his execution.326  The Florida Supreme 
Court interpreted the United States Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari as 
indicating that Florida’s death penalty statute was constitutional and consis-
tent with Ring.327 Although, the United States Supreme Court declined to 
hear the Bottoson case, the Florida Supreme Court was incorrect when they 
summarily perceived this to mean that Florida’s death penalty was constitu-
tional irrespective of Ring since it is “well-settled . . . that denial of certio-
rari imparts no implication or inference concerning the court’s view of the 
merits.”328
Furthermore, Justice Wells noted that if the Ring case had somehow 
compromised the constitutionality of Florida’s death penalty statute, the 
Supreme Court would likely not have removed the stay knowing that the 
petitioner would be executed.  Instead, the Court would have remanded the 
case for further consideration.  What neither Justice Wells or the U.S. Su-
preme Court considered, however, was whether rule in Ring could apply 
retroactively to criminal cases on final or direct appeal.   
On June 24, 2004, the United States Supreme Court held that the rule 
in Ring did not apply retroactively to death penalty cases already on final or 
direct review.329  The Court in Summerlin held that the Ring decision merely 
altered the method of determining the presence of facts not changing the 
facts themselves.330
As further justification for upholding Florida’s capital sentencing 
scheme, the Florida Supreme Court pointed out that Florida’s death penalty 
statute had been thoroughly scrutinized and held to be constitutional by the 
United States Supreme Court over the past twenty-six years.331  One such 
case used to support the court’s position was Hildwin v. Florida.332  How-
ever, the Hildwin case was one of the cases utilized by the Supreme Court 
in Walton v. Arizona to uphold the now unconstitutional Arizona statute in 
which a judge was permitted to determine sentencing factors without the 
assistance of a jury.333  While the Supreme Court later overruled Walton
326
 Id. at 697.  
327
 Id. at 698 (Wells, J. concurring).   
328
 Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262 n.11 (1982); see also Singleton v. C.I.R., 439 U.S. 940, 
944 (1978) (holding that the “Court has rigorously insisted that . . . a denial [of certiorari] carries with it 
no implication whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has declined to 
review.”).     
329
 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004) (holding that the Ring decision did not apply 
retroactively to death penalty cases already on final review because the Ring decision was procedural 
and not substantive).      
330
 Id. at 2524. 
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with Ring, the Florida Supreme Court continues to distinguish Florida’s 
sentencing scheme from that which was used in Arizona.334
The Florida Supreme Court holds to the distinction that while Ari-
zona’s statute permitted a judge to determine the presence of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances without a jury, under Florida’s statute, a judge 
does not sit alone.335  A judge and a jury hear the evidence and then based 
on the advisory sentence of the jury, the judge decides whether the imposi-
tion of death is warranted.336  The distinction of this jury-involvement pro-
cedure that the court points to is weak seeing as the United States Supreme 
Court has held that “[t]he dispositive question . . . is one not of form, but of 
effect.”337  The jury’s true effect in Florida under its capital sentencing 
scheme was clear to the United States Supreme Court when it held that,   
[a] Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury’s findings of 
fact with respect to sentencing issues than does a trial judge in Arizona 
because in Florida[,] the jury recommends a sentence, but it does not 
make specific factual findings with regard to the existence of mitigat-
ing or aggravating circumstances and its recommendation is not bind-
ing on the trial judge.338
Is there a difference between Florida’s jury advisory sentence and Ari-
zona’s judge who sits alone?  Perhaps in form there is, yet in substance is 
there a distinction?  A clarification of the jury’s role in Florida’s scheme is 
needed to truly determine whether there is a difference.   
After a defendant is found guilty of capital murder, a separate proceed-
ing is commenced.339  During this sentencing phase, the prosecution and the 
defense introduce aggravating and mitigating evidence before a judge and 
jury.340  At the conclusion, the jury must weigh the factors and by a majority 
render an advisory sentence to the judge.341  This advisory opinion is not 
binding on the court for the court must independently weigh the circum-
stances and enter its own decision.342  Under existing Florida law, a judge 
334
 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 699 (Quince, J. concurring) (the United States Supreme Court receded 
Walton because the Arizona statute allowed “a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggra-
vating circumstances necessary for the imposition of death penalty[;] [t]his language alone distinguishes 
the Florida death scheme from Arizona[’s]”).  
335
 Id.
336
 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 700. 
337 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002).   
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 Walton, 497 U.S. 648.  See also Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 704 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in result 
only) (noting that Florida’s Supreme Court cannot ignore the impact of Ring and the Supreme Court’s 
comparison of Arizona’s and Florida’s death penalty schemes).  
339
 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (2002). 
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 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2002). 
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 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2002).  However, the trial judge must accord deference to the jury’s 
recommendation.  See Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). 
2007] Evaluating Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme  135
may find aggravating circumstances, during a post-sentencing hearing, that 
were never offered before a jury.343  Furthermore, if a death sentence is im-
posed, it is the judge’s findings of fact that are reduced to writing, not the 
jury’s.344 Without the jury’s written records of findings, an appellate court 
would not be able to review what, if any factors a jury found to be present 
during the sentencing phase.  Therefore, the extent of the jury’s role in the 
sentencing phase becomes unclear, because during a post-conviction ap-
peal, the appellate court cannot give adequate consideration to a jury’s rec-
ommended sentence, since it is the judge’s finding of facts which are re-
viewed.345
Additionally, it appears as if the role of the jury is at times not as vital 
as the Florida Supreme Court in Bottoson claimed it to be.346  In Sochor v. 
Florida, the United States Supreme Court reversed an affirmed decision by 
the Florida Supreme Court where the petitioner argued that his Eighth 
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment was violated when 
during the sentencing phase the jury weighed an aggravating factor that was 
not enumerated in Florida’s Statue.347  The Florida Supreme Court held the 
error to be harmless and affirmed the trial courts holding.348 The petitioner 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court and although the court va-
cated and remanded, Florida argued before the Court that the error was 
harmless because after all, the trial judge is the sentencer, and the jury 
merely functions in an advisory capacity.349
While only three states use a “hybrid” sentencing system,350 only 
Delaware requires a unanimous decision when determining the presence of 
343
 Davis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 1998). 
344
 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(a)(b) (2002).  
345
 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 724 (Pariente, J. concurring in result only) (observing that in Washing-
ton v. State, 835 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2002), where the trial judge overrode a jury’s recommendation for life 
sentence and on appeal at that time, the court could evaluate the jury’s consideration of the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances).  See also id. at 708 (Anstead, C.J. concurring in result only) (noting that 
a potential Furman problem arises because the jury’s recommendation is not supported by findings of 
fact and thus a reviewing court will not be able to accurately determine what factors the jury found when 
making its recommendation). 
346 See generally Bottoson, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002). 
347 Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992).    
348 Sochor v. State, 580 So.2d 595, 604 (1991). 
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 See Sochor, 504 U.S. 527 (respondent’s brief 1992 WL 606715 (U.S.) (Under Florida's sen-
tencing scheme, the jury's role is strictly advisory. The trial judge makes independent factual findings, in 
writing, to support a sentence of death). 
350
 These states are Florida, Alabama and Delaware.  See Aarons, supra note 86, at 18; Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187, 198 (1976) (noting that Georgia’s new sentencing scheme required that a jury 
make specific findings of facts as to the presence of  aggravating and or mitigating circumstances before 
the imposition of death); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1976) (the basic difference between 
the Florida system and the Georgia system is that in Florida the trial judge determines the sentence 
rather than the jury; the Florida procedures for imposition of the death penalty satisfy the constitutional 
deficiencies identified in Furman).  
72
136 FIU Law Review [2:97
aggravating and or mitigating factors.351  Florida does not require a unani-
mous decision when deciding the presence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors.352  Justice Anstead, concurring in result only in Bottoson argued that 
Apprendi and Ring mandated that “aggravating sentencing factors, just like 
elements of a crime, must be found by a unanimous jury vote.”353  Although 
not available to the majority in Bottoson, the United States Supreme Court 
in Blakely held that, “[t]he Framers would not have thought it too much to 
demand that, before depriving a man of . . . his liberty, the State should suf-
fer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to the unanimous 
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors . . . rather than a lone em-
ployee of the State.”354 In Blakely the Court further noted that whereas suf-
frage provides a balance in favor of the people over elected officials in the 
legislative and executive branches, a right to a jury trial allows this control 
over the judiciary.355
STATUTORY MAXIMUM SENTENCE 
Apprendi mandated that any fact, not including a prior conviction, 
which increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum, must be sub-
mitted to a jury.356 Ring expanded the application of Apprendi to encompass 
capital punishment statutes.357  The Florida Supreme Court in Bottoson held 
that the traditional definition of maximum statutory sentence is “that sen-
tence which a state legislature or Congress has determined to be the outer 
limit of what can be imposed for a particular crime.”358  As applied to Flor-
ida, this would translate that upon conviction of a capital felony, death 
would be the maximum statutory sentence.359  Yet, mandatory death penalty 
statutes that expose a defendant to death solely based on the trial jury’s ver-
dict are unconstitutional.360  Recall that in Dobbert, the United States Court 
351
 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(3)(b)(1) (stating that “in order to find the existence of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection (e). . . beyond a reasonable doubt the 
jury must be unanimous as to the existence of that statutory aggravating circumstance).  However the 
jury’s decision is not binding on the judge.  Ortiz v. State, 869 A. 2d 285, 309-10 (Del. 2005). 
352
 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-49; FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2). 
353 Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 709 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J. concurring). 
354 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004). 
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 Id. at 2538.  
356
 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that “any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury . . . and 
established beyond a reasonable doubt.”).    
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 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that Walton and Apprendi were irrec-
oncilable and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence required that aggravating circumstance necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty be found by a jury).    
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 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 700.  
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 Id. at 700 n.10. 
360
 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (finding that mandatory death 
penalty statutes are unconstitutional because they fall short of allowing the sentencer to consider rele-
vant aspects of the character a convicted defendant before the imposition of a sentence of death).   
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held that being sentenced to death in Florida was “not automatic.”361 For 
this reason, the mandates of Furman and Woodson require the states to con-
duct a separate proceeding to determine whether the imposition of death is 
appropriate.362  It is during this separate procedure under Florida’s death 
penalty sentencing scheme that the defendant is in fact exposed to the pos-
sibility of being sentenced to death.363  In Ring, Arizona argued that the 
statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder was death.364  However, 
the Court held that Arizona’s first-degree murder statute cross-referenced a 
separate sentencing section which directed the judge to “conduct a separate 
sentencing hearing to determine the existence or nonexistence of certain 
circumstances before imposing the sentence.”365  If Florida’s sentencing 
structure parallels Arizona’s statute in design, in that the trial jury’s verdict 
alone will not be sufficient to impose the penalty of death on the defendant, 
then Florida’s sentencing scheme is bound by the rules developed in Ap-
prendi and Ring.  Although the definition of “statutory maximum” may be 
difficult to discern, the Court in Blakely provided guidance.366 Blakely ex-
plained that a statutory maximum, under an Apprendi application, was the 
maximum sentence a judge could impose “solely on the basis of the facts 
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”367  The Blakely
Court went on to hold that a judge, who imposes a sentence beyond the 
jury’s verdict, has exceeded his authority.368  Despite the precedent, the 
Florida Supreme Court continues to find the death penalty statute constitu-
tional.369
WEIGHING OF THE FACTORS: MANDATORY GUIDELINES
A court must follow Florida’s death penalty scheme when determining 
whether an individual should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.370
361 Dobbert, 432 U.S. 282. 
362 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 267 (1972).  See Diamond, supra note, 21; Woodson, 428 
U.S. at 304 (noting that the “Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of 
the individual defendant.”). 
363 FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2). 
364 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 592 (2002).  
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 Id. (“Arizona[’s] first-degree murder statute [resembling Florida’s murder statute], authorize[d] 
a maximum penalty of death only in a formal sense, for it explicitly cross-references the statutory provi-
sion requiring the finding of an aggravating circumstance before imposition of the death penalty.”). 
366 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004).   
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 Id. at 2537. 
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 See State v. Duncan, 894 So. 2d 817, 831 (Fla. 2004); Power v. State, 886 So. 2d 952, 965 (Fla. 
2004). 
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The trial court’s verdict alone does not sentence an individual to death.371  It 
is the legislatively created mandate, separate from the statute prescribing 
the offense, which ultimately exposes a defendant to death.  The United 
States Supreme Court, through its capital punishment jurisprudence, has 
held that the determination to impose the death penalty on a given individ-
ual must be provided by a sentencer who is governed by a procedure which 
furnishes guidance in determining the ultimate sentence.372  Although the 
United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Booker v. United States
dealt with federal sentencing guidelines, implications to Florida’s death 
penalty guidelines may be inferred.373
Relying on Apprendi and Blakely, the Court in Booker held that the 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury applied to mandatory sentencing 
schemes and therefore, relevant facts required to impose a sentence must be 
determined by juries, not judges.374 The Federal Guidelines bound the sen-
tencing court in Booker; the judge was mandated to follow the provisions.375
The Court concluded that because these guidelines were mandatory, they 
had the force and effect of laws.376  As was the sentencing court in Booker,
the sentencing court in Florida is bound by the hybrid-sentencing scheme 
where the weighing of factors determines the sentence to be imposed.377
The Court in Booker distinguished the mandatory guidelines from advisory 
provisions holding that, “[i]f the Guidelines . . . could be read as merely 
advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required . . . their use 
would not implicate the Sixth Amendment; [however, the] “Guidelines as 
written . . . are not advisory; they are mandatory and binding on all judges . 
. ..”
378
  Through Booker, the Court extends the protection of the Sixth 
Amendment to mandatory sentencing schemes noting that these principles 
“are not the product of recent innovations in our jurisprudence, but rather 
371
 Id. (“Upon conviction . . . of guilt  . . . of a capital felony . . . the court shall . . .) (emphasis 
added).  
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presumptive sentencing structure where judges are given a narrow range of permissible sentences, 
Booker mandates that a judge cannot find facts beyond those found by the jury). 
374 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct 738, 742 (2005). 
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 Id. at 749-50 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (noting that Congress 
chose to “adopt a “mandatory-guideline system” rather than a system that would have been “only advi-
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ida is not entirely analogous to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it is binding on the courts and its 
origin can be traced to the Furman decision which recognized that a death penalty scheme that does not 
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have their genesis in the ideals our constitutional tradition assimilated from 
the common law.”379  One may try to distinguish Florida’s capital sentenc-
ing scheme from the Guidelines discussed in Booker; however, they share a 
common theme, both are mandatory.380  Furthermore, other factors add to 
the compulsory character of the state’s capital punishment sentencing 
scheme.  Its creation was based on the establishment that “the death sen-
tence is unique in its severity and its irrevocability.”381  Also, “the jury-trial 
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of 
the level of punishment that the defendant receives--whether the statute 
calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane--must 
be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”382  The state’s capital pun-
ishment sentencing scheme does not appear to provide advisory provisions 
that merely recommend sentencing ranges.  After all, the language is quite 
clear: “[T]he court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, shall enter a sentence of life or death . . . .” (emphasis added).383
In both Duncan and Power, the Florida Supreme Court utilized the 
trial court’s verdict during the guilt phase to avoid a Ring violation.384  The 
sentencing court carried over the trial court jury’s findings of fact during the 
guilt/innocence phase as aggravating factors in order to comply with both 
the principles in Ring and Florida’s capital punishment sentencing scheme.  
The court’s rationale was that the aggravating factors needed to satisfy the 
imposition of death pursuant to the penalty phase were “charged by indict-
ment and found unanimously by the jury.”385  On the surface, this strategy 
seems to comport with the holdings in Apprendi and Ring.386
However, the court overlooks the underlying purpose of Florida’s capi-
tal punishment sentencing scheme.  Furman and its progeny have held that 
in order for a capital sentencing scheme to be constitutional, the statute 
must “genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty . . 
. and must justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant 
379
 Id. at 753. 
380
 See id. at 749-750.  The court is bound to weigh the factors and decide between a sentence of 
life imprisonment or death.  See also McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (comparing the 
sentencing guidelines to “Gregg-type statute[s]”—referring to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 187, 153 
(1976)).          
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384 State v. Duncan, 894 So. 2d 817, 831 (Fla. 2004) (holding that because an aggravating factor, 
prior conviction of a felony, was charged in the indictment and found beyond a reasonable doubt the 
imposition of the death penalty was constitutional); Power v. State, 886 So. 2d 952,  965 (Fla. 2004) 
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compared to others found guilty of murder.”387  Unlike any other area, when 
dealing with capital punishment, the Court has placed special constraints on 
states’ “legislatures’ ability to determine what facts shall lead to . . . pun-
ishment[, and]  . . . [the] ability to define crimes.388  Aggravating factors are 
designed to guide the sentencer with a “rational criteria [which] . . . [will] 
narrow [his] . . . judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular 
defendant’s case meet the [constitutional] threshold.”389  By allowing the 
trial court’s factual findings to survive any Ring infirmity, the Florida Su-
preme Court does not consider that the sentencing statute calls for the 
weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, not the mere existence 
of an aggravating factor.390  The outcome of weighing the opposing factors 
is the process by which the sentence is ultimately determined.  For if the 
court relies solely on presence of the aggravating factors, the court is either 
doing the actual weighing or the trial jury’s finding of fact is not being con-
sidered in light of any mitigating factors within the context of sentencing.  
Mitigating factors are an intricate part of the statute’s weighing process in 
as much as, “mitigating factors . . . might induce a sentencer to give a lesser 
punishment.”391  Furthermore, if the findings of fact which established the 
presence of aggravating factors are permitted to be “imported” from the 
guilt phase and used in the sentencing phase, other than providing a non-
binding advisory opinion, what role does the sentencing jury play?  The 
responsibility of the sentencing jury must be genuine because “it is consti-
tutionally impermissible to rest the death sentence on a determination made 
by a sentencer [that] has been led to believe that the responsibility for de-
termining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.”392
CONCLUSION
The Furman Court understood that to allow the trial jury to sentence 
the defendant to death based solely on the findings of fact that it had con-
sidered to establish his guilt would not take into consideration “particular-
ized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each 
convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of 
death.”393  Therefore, it is in this subsequent proceeding that the aggravating 
circumstances must be weighed against mitigating circumstances to estab-
387
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388
 Apprendi, 536 U.S. at 522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
389 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987).  
390
 FLA. STAT. §§ 921.141 (2)(a), (3). (it is not the mere existence of aggravating factors, but rather 
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penalty appropriate).  
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lish the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and char-
acteristics of the defendant.”394
It is the result or conclusion of the process by which the statutory fac-
tors are weighed that truly imposes the appropriate sentence.  Merely be-
cause elements of a crime, which are required to be proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt by a jury during the guilt phase, overlap aggravating factors 
that need to be weighed against mitigating factors, does not cure the state’s 
constitutional infirmity.  The facts determined at the trial level serve their 
purpose within the trial level context in which they are established—to 
prove that a crime was committed and to establish the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence.395
In cases where facts used to establish guilt overlap facts needed to de-
termine the presence of aggravating factors, the jury’s trial findings of fact 
should not be used in the context of the sentencing phase.  While the need 
to have the facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt at the sentencing phase 
may not be constitutionally required, at a minimum, these facts must be 
weighed against mitigating factors to determine the proper sentence.  In the 
sentencing phase framework, the findings which ultimately determine the 
proper punishment must be determined by a sentencing jury and not a 
judge, for “the jury [can]not function as circuitbreaker in the State’s ma-
chinery of justice if it were relegated to making a determination that the 
defendant [committed the murder] . . . a mere preliminary to a judicial in-
quisition into the facts of the crime the State actually seeks to punish.396  In 
essence, Florida does not seek to impose a sentence of death on all who 
commit murder, not even those who commit murder when aggravating cir-
cumstances are established.  The death penalty is sought only on those who, 
after considerations insufficient mitigating circumstances exist which out-
weigh the aggravating circumstances. 
During a capital murder case, the jury convicts the defendant of mur-
der when it determines that a crime has been committed and the defendant 
is responsible.  This determination of guilt alone, without any additional 
findings, does not permit the judge to impose death.397  However, as in 
Booker, a second proceeding is held to determine the appropriate sentence.  
To reach the appropriate sentence, aggravating factors must be weighed 
against mitigating factors.  It is the result of this “balancing” of factors that 
ultimately determines the sentence.  Just as the judge in Booker found that 
the defendant possessed 566 grams of crack in excess to the trial jury’s 
394 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct 738, 743 (2005).   
395
 The findings of the trial jury, although relevant to the guilt or innocence of the charged crime, 
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effect to the mitigating evidence which Furman mandated.  
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findings,398 in Florida, the sentencing judge alone, in excess to the trial 
jury’s finding of guilt, renders the outcome of the “balancing” of the aggra-
vating and mitigating factors.399  In the final analysis, this judicial determi-
nation exceeds the sentence which may be imposed solely on the basis of 
the facts reflected by the jury verdict.   
Consequently, as the Court held in Blakely, “the jury’s verdict alone 
does not authorize the sentence. The judge acquires that authority only upon 
finding some additional fact.”400  Since the Florida judge acquires the au-
thority to impose the sentence of death pursuant to the capital sentencing 
scheme, and not the trial court’s verdict, the actual outcome of the weighing 
of the factors is a finding of fact that ultimately determines the proper sen-
tence.  In sum, “[t]here is no relevant distinction between the sentence im-
posed pursuant to the Washington statutes in Blakely, . . . the sentences im-
posed pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines [in Booker], . . . and 
the death penalty in Florida.”401
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme came about from its compliance 
with Furman; however, “the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment relates 
to the character of the punishment, and not to the process by which it is 
imposed.”402  Florida’s process, while conforming to Furman, does not con-
form to the United State Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence regarding 
the principles behind the jury trial right.  Florida can remedy this deficiency 
by amending the statute and allow a jury, and not the judge, to determine 
the proper sentence.  After all: 
jurors possess an important comparative advantage over judges, . . . 
they are more attuned to the community’s moral sensibility,” . . . be-
cause they “reflect more accurately the composition and experiences 
of the community as a whole. Hence they are more likely to “express 
the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or 
death,” and better able to determine in the particular case the need for 
retribution, namely, “an expression of the community’s belief that cer-
tain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the 
only adequate response may be the penalty of death.403                  
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